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Security Interests In Exempt Personalty: Toward
Safeguarding Basic Exempt Necessities
James B. Haines, Jr. *
I. Introduction
Exemption statutes are designed to protect debtors against total
divesture of their real and personal estates.' Such statutes insulate
debtors from abject poverty by preserving a minimum amount of
property free from the claims of creditors.2 The protection afforded
by exemption statutes, however, is often more illusory than real. In
most jurisdictions, while prospective exemption waivers are prohib-
ited, creditors can nonetheless obtain a security interest even in the
most basic exempt necessity.3 The current state of the law has unde-
sirable effects on debtor-creditor relations4 and may frustrate the
objectives of federal bankruptcy legislation. 5 This article examines
the purpose and operation of exemption statutes as a part of state
debtor-creditor law and suggests possible statutory and judicial
reforms.
I. Background
An exemption has been defined as "a right given by law to a
debtor to retain portions of his property free from the claims of credi-
tors."6 A right of exemption can be created by statute7 or constitu-
tional provision." At common law virtually all of a debtor's estate
* Assistant Professor, West Virginia University College of Law. B.A., Washington State
University, 1970; J.D., Willamette University, 1977.
1 See notes 12-13 infra and accompanying text.
2 See note 18 infra and accompanying text.
3 See section IV infra.
4 See section IV D infia.
5 Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codi-
fied in 11 U.S.C.), state law governing debtors' exemptions is applicable in bankruptcy either
at the debtor's option or by state legislative mandate. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1978) and note
26 infra.
6 Hertz, Bankrupt Code Exemptions: Note on the Eet of State Law, 54 AM. BANKR. LJ.
339 (1980). The exemption insulates designated property from attachment or execution by
creditors. Id.
7 See Mayhugh v. Coon, 460 Pa. 128, 133, 331 A.2d 452, 454-55 & n.4 (1975).
8 Many state constitutions provide for legislative enactment of exemption laws. E.g.,
LA. CONST. art. 12, § 9; N.C. CONST. art X, §§ 1, 2; OKLA. CONSr. art. XII, §§ 1, 2, 3. One
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
was subject to appropriation and sale to satisfy his debts.9 Early stat-
utes shielded only the barest essentials-wearing apparel and bed-
ding '0 -from the claims of creditors. By the mid-nineteenth century,
however, exemption statutes extended protection to a wider range of
personal property and realty."
The motivating forces behind the historical enlargement of ex-
emption rights are varied.12 Uniformly, however, exemption statutes
reflect a legislative judgment that the need to preserve basic necessi-
ties for debtors and their families outweighs the benefit society de-
rives from the strict enforcement of debtors' obligations. Exemption
statutes are intended to enable debtors and their families to continue
to function as independent economic units13 during periods of
financial embarassment.
state's constitutional exemption provisions are entirely self-executing. ARK. CONST. art. 9,
§§ 1-5.
9 Indeed, at early common law, the debtor's body itself was subject to seizure and incar-
ceration if sufficient property could not be found to satisfy his indebtedness. See Note, Bod
Attachment and Body Execution: Forgotten But Not Gone, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 543 (1976).
10 Vukowich, De6tors'Exemption Rights, 62 GEo. L.J. 779, 782 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Vukowich].
11 COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA 257-58 (1974). According to Cole-
man, the expansion of debtors' exemption rights led to restrictions on creditors' rights to
enforce payment through imprisonment. These developments were part of a broader social
movement toward a commercial and legal system that fostered individual freedom and inde-
pendence. Id. See Mayhugh v. Coon, 460 Pa. 128, 134, 331 A.2d 452, 455 (1975) ("freedom
from imprisonment for debt would be meaningless if the debtor could, nevertheless, be
stripped of all belongings and deprived of all means of regaining a modicum of economic
stability").
12 See text accompanying notes 17-22 infia.
13 One noted commentator explained:
While variety characterizes even the objectives of exemption legislation, a per-
sistent theme is the protection of the family of the debtor from penury. Exemption
legislation embodies a deliberate choice of policy to prefer the social interest in
providing a minimum of economic security and other benefits to debtors and their
families-over the economic interests to be served by assuring creditors the maxi-
mum availability of their debtor's property for the satisfaction of their claims.
Kennedy, Limitation ofExemptions in Banhruply, 45 IowA L. REv. 445, 447-48 (1959) (footnotesdeleted). See a/so Note, Banknptcy Exemptions: Critique and Suggestions, 68 YALE L.J. 1459
(1959) [hereinafter cited as Bankruptcy Note] ("[I]n a community which is concerned with
the well-being of its individual members, the social cost of leaving a debtor and his family
without resources may outweigh the economic disadvantage of immunizing property from the
claims of creditors.').
Exemption statutes were enacted to protect debtors' families against destitution. Many
states provide more generous exemptions for debtors with dependents, e.g. ARK. CONST. art.
9, § 2 (personal property); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-101 (1979) (real and personal property);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 651-92 (Supp. 1980) (real property); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 188,
§ 1 (West 1981) (real property); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 435, 440, 513 (Vernon Supp. 1980) (spe-
cific items of personal property or a mix of real and personal property). See also In re Perry,
225 F. Supp. 481, 482 (N.D. Ohio 1963) (purpose of exemption statutes is to protect debtor's
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The proper balance between debtor protection and creditors'
rights has long been the subject of debate. 14 Similarly, the degree to
which exemption rights are vested indefeasibly in the debtor and the
relative ease with which such rights may be forfeited are matters of
some controversy.' 5  As a result, debtor exemption statutes vary
greatly from state to state.' 6
The diversity of debtor exemption provisions has also been at-
tributed to: (1) traditional notions of debtor culpability;' 7 (2) con-
cern for the plight of the families of spendthrifts;' (3) a desire to
limit welfare payments by preventing indigency; 19 (4) a desire to pro-
vide minimal property with which a debtor can start anew;20 (5) ru-
ral distrust of urban merchants; 2' and, (6) a desire to encourage
frontier settlement.22 Today exemption statutes remain widely dis-
parate in the amount 23 and categories24 of property they protect.
The variety of debtor exemption provisions is of significance not only
to the determination of state debtor-creditor rights,25 but also to the
family); National Bank v. Chapman, 212 Iowa 561, 234 N.W. 198 (1931). See text accompa-
nying notes 69-75 infra.
14 An early commentator considered the legislative purpose of exemption statutes to be
"to afford to the debtor, and to his family the prime necessities of life, and to furnish the
insolvent a nucleus wherewith to begin life anew." G. PENDLETON, DEBTORS' EXEMPTIONS
IN PENNSYLVANIA 18 (1886). During the same period, however, others were criticizing ex-
emption statutes as unduly generous. J. GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROP-
ERTY § 263 at 247 n.1 (2d ed. 1895). Over the years, "legislative sympathy with the debtor
class has fluctuated with the economic barometer." Bankruptcy Note, supra note 13, at 1459.
15 See section IV in/a. These issues have been resolved in a variety of ways. See sections
III and IV in/a; compare Mayhugh v. Coon, 460 Pa. 128, 331 A.2d 452 (1975), with Case v.
Dunmore, 23 Pa. 93 (1854).
16 See general45 Vukowich, supra note 10; Joslin, Debtors' Exemption Laws. Time for Moderni-
zation, 34 IND. L.J. 355 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Joslin].
17 Case v. Dunmore, 23 Pa. 93, 94-95 (1854); Bowman v. Smiley, 31 Pa. 225, 226 (1858).
See Rombauer, Debtor's Exemption Statutes-Revision Ideas, 36 WASH. L.REv. 484 (1961).
18 J. SMYTH, HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTIONS § 1 at 49 (1875); THOMPSON, A TREATISE
ON HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTION LAWS § 1 (1878).
19 See Bankruptcy Note, supra note 13.
20 G. PENDLEION, DEBTORS' EXEMPTIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA 18 (1886).
21 Vukowich, sra note 10, at 783 & n.19.
22 Id.
23 Compare TEx. CIV. CODE ANN. tit. 57 §§ 3833 (200 acre exempt rural family home-
stead), 3836 ($30,000 family personal property exemption) (Vernon Supp. 1980) with ARK.
CONST. art. 9, § 2 ($500 personal property exemption for head of family), §§ 3-5 ($2,500
homestead exemption for head of family).
24 Eg., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 690.25 (West 1980) (church pews); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-352c(b) (West Supp. 1980) (wedding rings); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1301(2) (1979)
(horse or mule or one yoke of oxen); IDAHO CODE § 11-605(6) (1979) (water right used for
irrigation); KY. REV. STAT. § 427.010 (Supp. 1980) (spare tire for motor vehicle); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 4401(7), (10) (1980) (sled, fishing boat).
25 See Joslin, supra note 16, at 355-60; Kennedy, Limitation of Exemptioas in Bankru1tf, 45
[Vol. 57:215]
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administration of federal bankruptcy laws.2 6
Notwithstanding the diversity of exemption statutes, near total
harmony exists in the treatment of prospective exemption waivers.27
With few exceptions, 28 prospective waivers29 have been declared
void, either by the express language of an exemption statute3° or by
judicial interpretation of statutory policy.31 The vast majority of
states, however, have permitted debtors to waive their rights to retain
IOWA L. REV. 445, 446-47 (1959); Countryman, For a New Exemption Poliy in Bankruptq, 14
RUTGERS L. REV. 678, 681 (1960).
26 The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended by Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1897-98) (codified in
11 U.S.C. (1976)) (repealed Pub. L. 95-598, tit. IV, §§ 401(a), 402(a), 92 Stat. 2682, efj. Octo-
ber 1, 1979), expressly incorporated the exemption laws of the state of a debtor's domicile for
the six months preceding filing of the petition. 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1976) (repealed 1979). Re-
formers lobbied for a federal bankruptcy exemption provision which would eliminate refer-
ence to state law for determination of a debtor's exemption rights. See Countryman, Fora New
Exemption Policy in Bankruptc, 14 RUTGERS L. REv., 678, 746 (1960); Bankruptcy Note, supra
note 13, at 1507-14; Vukowich, The Bankrupt Commision's Proposals Regarding Bankruptr' Er-
emption Rightr, 63 CAL. L. REv. 1439 (1975). A uniform federal exemption scheme, however,
was not without scholarly opposition. See Kennedy, Limitation o(Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 45
IOWA L. REv. 445,485-86 (1959). The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 permits the debtor to
select either the exemption rights available to him under the law of his state of domicile for
the 180 days preceding the filing of the petition or the exemptions set forth in the Bankruptcy
Reform Act itself. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b), (d) (1978). States may by statute require domiciliary
debtors to use only state law and non-bankruptcy federal law exemptions. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)
(1978). This article considers consensual liens in exempt property as a matter of state law, but
the reforms proposed will have significance in federal bankruptcy law by operation of
§ 522(b).
27 -See, e.g., Mayhugh v. Coon, 460 Pa. 128, 137, 331 A.2d 452, 456 & n.6 (1975) (holding
that exemption waivers are void as contrary to public policy). See Section III injfa.
28 See notes 53-55 infra and accompanying text.
29 A "prospective waiver" of exemption rights is a promise, given by the debtor, that he
will not assert his exemption rights against the creditor's efforts to collect the debt. The
waiver is given as consideration for credit or forebearance. Such waivers are executory and
do not create liens in specific property contemporaneously with their execution. Thus they
can be distinguished from security interests, chattel mortgages and conditional sales contracts.
See Celco, Inc. v. Davis Van Lines, 226 Kan. 366, 369, 598 P.2d 188, 190 (1979). Exemption
waivers may also be created when a tenant-debtor grants a landlord-creditor the right to
enter his premises, seize property, and sell it in satisfaction of the debt for accrued rent. Cur-
tiss v. Ellenwood, 59 Ill. App. 110 (1894).
30 E.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-5813.1 (1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-23-11
(Supp. 1981); W. VA. CODE § 38-8-15 (Cum. Supp. 1981); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 8122 (Purdon Pamph. 1981); But see ALA. CODE § 6-10-2 (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 4912 (1975); VA. CODE § 34-22 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
31 E.g., Sherbill v. Miller Mfg. Co., 89 So. 2d 28, 30-31 (Fla. 1956); Maloney v. Newton,
85 Ind. 565, 566 (1882); Morgan Plan Co. v. Ates, 8 La. App. 806, 809 (1928); Teague v.
Weeks, 89 Miss. 360, 42 So. 172 (1906); Kneettle v. Newcomb, 22 N.Y. 249, 250-51 (1860);
Maxwell v. Reed, 7 Wis. 493, 498-99 (1859). But see Broadway v. Household Fin. Corp., 351
So. 2d 1373 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977); Lawrence v. Commercial Banking Corp., 165 Md. 559,
560, 169 A. 69, 70 (1933).
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exempt property either through creation of nonpossessory, 32 nonpur-
chase-money 33 security interests, 34 or by granting mortgages35 in ex-
32 Security interests created through pledges of personal property, i.e. where possession of
personalty is transferred to a creditor, present problems distinct from nonpossessory security
interests. See I G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 1.1 (1965).
33 Purchase money security interests are those:
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price;
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives
value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such value is
in fact so used.
U.C.C. § 9-107 (1976). States routinely provide that purchase money security interests in
personal property will take precedence over claims of exemption in such property. See
ALASKA STAT. § 09.35.080(a)(7) (Cum. Supp. 1980); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1122
(Supp. 1980); ARK. CONST. art. 9, § 1; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-54-103 (1974); GA. CODE
ANN. § 51-101 (1979); HAwAIi REV. STAT. § 651-122 (Supp. 1980); IDAHO CODE § 11-
607(1)(b)(1) (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 52, § 3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 627.5 (West 1950); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3885 (West Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 550.37(4) (West Cum. Supp. 1980); NEV. REV. STAT. § 21.090(2) (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A-17-19 (West Supp. 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-10-6 (1978); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW
§ 5205(a) (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1980); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-14 (1978); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2329.661(A) (Page 1981); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 43-45-8 (1967); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 26-2-103(b) (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-23-10(l)(b)(i) (Supp. 1981); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2740 (1973); VA. CODE § 34-23 (Cum. Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 6.16.020 (Supp. 1981); W. VA. CODE § 38-8-11 (Supp. 1981).
Although a number of the foregoing provisions merely dictate that exemptions may not
be asserted against purchase-money security interests, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1122
(Supp. 1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-101 (1979); VA. CODE § 34-23 (Cum. Supp. 1981), many
states provide that debtors' exemptions may not be asserted against secured or unsecured
creditors in actions to recover the purchase price of the personalty, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.35.080(a)(7) (Cum. Supp. 1980); CoLo. REV. STAT. 13-54-103 (1974); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 21.090(2) (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A-17-19 (West Supp. 1981); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAw
§ 5205(a) (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1980); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-14 (1974); S.D. COMP.
LAWs ANN. § 43-45-9 (1969); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-23-10(1)(b)(i) (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 2740 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 6.16.020 (Supp. 1981); W. VA. CODE
§ 38-8-11 (Supp. 1980).
The rationale supporting such provisions is self evident; a debtor should not be able to
claim an exemption against the creditor whose extension of credit enabled the debtor to ac-
quire the property.
34 "Security interest" is defined in U.C.C. § 1-201 as "an interest in personal property or
fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation." I UNIFORM LAWS ANN.
(1976). The creation and perfection of security interests is governed by U.C.C. Article 9, a
version of which has been enacted in every state but Louisiana. 3 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. at 1
(Supp. 1980). The Article 9 security interest comprehends nearly all devices by which credi-
tors obtain rights in personal property of the debtor as security for a debt or obligation. See
U.C.C. §§ 9-102, 9-202.
35 The chattel mortgage, an historical predecessor of the security interest, was a statutory
device by which a creditor could obtain a nonpossessory interest in a debtor's personal prop-
erty. See generally I G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 2.1-2.8
(1965). The chattel mortgage has been replaced by the U.C.C. Article 9 security interest, see
note 34 s'upra. Many of the early cases considering exemption "waivers" focused on the
[Vol. 57:215]
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empt assets. 36
Traditional notions of property law37 and freedom of contract 38
inspired the distinction between prospective exemption waivers and
debtor's power to encumber his exempt assets through execution of a chattel mortgage or
similar device. See text accompanying note 128 infra.
Debtors are generally permitted to grant creditors nonpurchase-money mortgages in ex-
empt real property. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.35.090 (Cum. Supp. 1980); Aga. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 33-1101(c), 33-1102 (Supp. 1980); ARK. CONST. art. 9, § 3; CAL. CIlv. PRC.
CODE § 690.31(b)(3)(ii) (West Supp. 1981); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-41-201 (Supp. 1980); HA-
WAII REV. STAT. § 651-92 (Supp. 1980); IDAHO CODE § 55-1005(3) (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 52, § 4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-2-28-13 (Burns 1973 & Supp.
1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 561.13 (1950 & Supp. 1980); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 427.060
(Baldwin 1972 & Cum. Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 14, § 4552(1) (1980); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 188, § 7 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1981); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.6023(a)(8)
(1977); MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-3-21 (1973 & Supp. 1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 40-103 (1979 &
Supp. 1980); NEV. REV. STAT. § 21.090(2) (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 480.4 (1968 &
Supp. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-10-11 (1978 & Supp. 1980); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW
§ 5206(a) (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1980); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.661 (A)(1) (Page
1980); S.C. CONST. art. III, § 28; S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 43-31-17 (1969 & Supp. 1980);
TENN. CIV. CODE ANN. § 26-2-301(b) & (c) (1980); TEx. CIV. CODE ANN. tit. 57, § 3835
(Vernon 1966 & Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-23-4(4) (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN.
§ 103 (1975 & Supp. 1980); VA. CODE § 34-23 (Cum. Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 6.12.100 (1963); W. VA. CODE § 38-9-6 (1966 Supp. 1980); Wis. STAT. AN. § 815.20 (West
1977).
A debtor's equity in residential real property subject to a homestead exemption is often
substantial. Thus, permitting the debtor to encumber the homestead through execution of a
second mortgage or similar instrument is economically justified. See Vukowich, supra note 10,
at 852. See a/so Wyoming County Bank & Trust Co. v. Kiley, 75 A.D.2d 477, 430 N.Y.S.2d
900, 903-04 (1980) (practical reasons for enforcing a second mortgage against a claim of
homestead exemption).
This article is limited to consideration of the reasons supporting or recommending
against the enforcement of nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interests in exempt
personal property.
36 States have permitted this type of "waiver" either by statute, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-1122 (Supp. 1980); ARK. CONST. art. 9, § 3; GA. CODE ANN. § 51-101 (1979);
HAWAIi REV. STAT. § 651-122 (Supp. 1980); IDAHO CODE § 11-607(2) (1979); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13:3885 (West Supp. 1980); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.6023(b) (1977); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 21.090(2) (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-10-6 (1978 & Supp. 1980); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2329.661 (Page 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-103(b) (1980); TEX. CIV.
CODE ANN. tit. 57, art. 3836(a) (Vernon 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-23-10(2) (Supp. 1981),
or by judicial decision, In Re Rade, 205 F. Supp. 336 (D. Colo. 1962); Carter's Adm'rs. v.
Carter, 20 Fla. 558, 51 Am. Rep. 618 (1884); Kay v. Furlow, 178 La. 637, 152 So. 315 (1934);
Aetna Fin. Co. v. Antoine, 343 So.2d 1195 (La. App. 1977); Hernandez v. S.I.C. Fin. Co., 79
N.M. 673, 448 P.2d 474 (1968); State v. AVCO Fin. Servs., 50 N.Y.2d 383, 406 N.E.2d 1075,
429 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1980); Congress Candy Co. v. Farmer, 73 N.D. 174, 12 N.W.2d 796 (1944);
Montford v. Grohman, 37 N.C. App. 71, 245 S.E.2d 219 (1978); Frost v. Shaw, 3 Ohio St.
270, 272-73 (1854); City Loan & Say. Co. v. Keenan, 136 Ohio St. 125, 24 N.E.2d 452 (1939);
Mutual Loan & Thrift Corp. v. Corn, 182 Tenn. 554, 188 S.W.2d 345 (1945); Sparkman v.
First State Bank, 246 S.W. 724 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); Cammarano v. Longmire, 99 Wash.
696, 169 P. 806 (1918).
37 See Mutual Loan & Thrift Corp. v. Corn, 182 Tenn. 554, 556, 188 S.W.2d 345, 346
(1945); and text accompanying note 103 infa.
[December 1981]
SECURITY INTERESTS
the creation of security interests in exempt personalty. Creditors
have exploited this distinction- through the use of "catch-all" or
"dragnet" collateral clauses39 and other security agreements. 40 Drag-
net collateral clauses subject all the debtor's personal property, even
the most basic instruments of comfort and support,41 to the threat of
38 See State v. AVCO Fin. Servs., 50 N.Y.2d 383, 406 N.E.2d 1075, 429 N.Y.S.2d 181
(1980); and text accompanying note 101 infra.
39 An example of a catch-all collateral clause is set forth in State v. AVCO Fin. Servs., 50
N.Y.2d 383, 406 N.E.2d 1075, 1078, 429 N.Y.S.2d 181, 183 (1980):
This loan is secured by . . . all household goods, furniture, appliances, and con-
sumer goods of every kind and description owned at the time of the loan secured
hereby, or at any refinance or renewal thereof, or cash advanced under the loan
agreement secured hereby, and located about the premises at the debtor's residence
(unless otherwise stated) or at any other location to which the goods could be
removed.
See a/so Hernndez v. S.I.C. Fin. Co., 79 N.M. 673, 448 P.2d 474 (1968); Montford v.
Grohman, 37 N.C. App. 71, 245 S.E.2d 219 (1978).
40 A "security agreement" is an agreement which "creates or provides for a security inter-
est." U.C.C. § 9-105(h).
41 Although some states, by statute or constitutional provision, permit debtors to desig-
nate any personal property up to a stated value as exempt, e.g. ALA. CODE § 6-10-2; ARK.
CONST. art. 9, §§ 1, 2; GA. CODE ANN. § 51-101 (1979) (alternative exemption); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 52, § 13 (Smith-Hurd 1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-2-28-1 (a) & (b) (Bums Cum.
Supp. 1980); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1552 (Cum. Supp. 1980); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A-17-19
(West Supp. 1981); N.C. CONsT. art. X, § 1; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-369 (1969); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 28-22-03 (1978 & Supp. 1979) (alternative exemption); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42,
§ 8123 (Purdon Pamph. 1981); S.C. CODE § 15-41-310 (1977); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 43-
45-4 (1969 & Supp. 1980) (alternative exemption); TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-102 (1980); VA.
CODE § 38-8-1 (Supp. 1981) (alternative exemption), the majority of jurisdictions exempts
specified values of household goods or household furnishings, ALASKA STAT. § 09.35.080(5)
(Cum. Supp. 1973); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1123 (Supp. 1980); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 690.1 (Deering 1973 & Supp. 1981); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-54-102(e) (1974 & Supp. 1980);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-352b(a) (West Supp. 1980); D.C. CODE ANN. § 15-5011(2)
(1973 & Supp. 1975); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-1301(5), 1301.1(4) (1979 & Supp. 1980) (alterna-
tive exemptions); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 651-121 (1976 & Supp. 1980); IDAHO CODE § 11-
605(a) (1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 627.6(13) (West 1950 & Supp. 1980); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 427.010 (Baldwin 1972 & Cum. Supp. 1980); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3881(4) (West
1968 & Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4401(1) (1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 235, § 34 (West 1974 & Supp. 1980); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.6023(2) (1977); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 550.37(4) (West Cur. Supp. 1980); MIsS. CODE ANN. § 85-3-1(r) (Cum. Supp.
1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 513.435(3) (Vernon Supp. 1980); NEV. REV. STAT. § 21.090(b)
(1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 511.2 (Supp. 1979); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAWS § 5205(5) (Mc-
Kinney 1978 & Supp. 1980); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-04(2) (1978 & Supp. 1979) (alterna-
tive exemption); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.66(a)(4)(b) (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 31 § 1(A)(3) (West Supp. 1980); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-26-4 (1969); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 43-45-5(2) (1969) (alternative exemption); TEX. CIV. CODE ANN. § 3836(a)(1) (Vernon
1966 & Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-23-5, 78-23-8 (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
12 § 2740 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE § 6.16.020(3) (Supp. 1980); W. VA. CODE § 38-10-4
(Cum. Supp. 1981) (alternative exemption); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 815-18(5) (West 1977 &
Supp. 1980 & Pamph. 1981).
Nearly all states that specifically exempt household goods and furnishings, .ee note 24
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repossession and sale upon default.42
The remainder of this article examines the law of debtors' per-
sonal property exemptions in light of public policy, and the rationale
supporting legislative and judicial disapproval of prospective exemp-
tion waivers. The creation and enforcement of nonpossessory, non-
purchase-money security interests in exempt property will be
discussed, followed by an examination of possible legislative and ju-
dicial reforms which would restrict the enforcement of security inter-
ests in exempt property.
III. Waivers43 of Exemption Rights: Public Policy4
Exemption laws reduce the pool of debtors' assets from which
supra, also provide an exemption for debtors' tools of trade or professional libraries. Eg.,
ALASKA STAT. § 09.35.080(4) (Cum. Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-352(b) (West
Supp. 1980); D.C. CODE § 15-501(5), (6) (1973 & Supp. 1975); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 651.121(3) (Supp. 1980); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 5205(a)(7) (McKinney 1978 & Supp.
1980). For a thoughtful critique of occupational exemptions, see Joslin, supra note 16, at 365-
68.
The exemption for wearing apparel predates most other specific category exemptions.
Historically, even during the period when virtually all of a debtor's assets could be seized to
satisfy his debts, his wearing apparel remained exempt. It was feared that seizure of wearing
apparel would lead to breaches of the peace and would offend common notions of decency.
See Vukowich, supra note 10, at 782. Most jurisdictions, including those which do not other-
wise categorize personal property exemptions, expressly exempt from seizure the necessary
wearing apparel of the debtor and his family. E.g., ALA. CODE § 6-10-2 (Supp. 1980);
ALASKA STAT. § 09.35.080(3) (Cum. Supp. 1980); ARK. CONsT. art. 9 § 1; D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 15-501(1) (1973 & Supp. 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 52, § 13 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4401(1) (1980); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:17-19 (West Supp. 1981);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-02(5) (1978 & Supp. 1979); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42,
§ 8124(a)(1) (Purdon Pamph. 1981); S.C. CODE § 15-41-310 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 6.16.020(1) (Supp. 1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 815.18(5) (West 1977 & Supp. 1981).
42 Under U.C.C. Article 9, when a debtor defaults a secured creditor is entitled to take
possession and to sell the property subject to the security interest. U.C.C. §§ 9-503, 9-504.
The secured party may take possession peacefully without first initiating judicial proceedings,
U.C.C. § 9-503, or he may resort to non-Code judicial procedures to obtain possession. Id.
See, e.g., Platte Valley Bank v. Kracl, 185 Neb. 168, 174 N.W.2d 724 (1970); Associates Dis-
count Corp. v. Harris, 87 Misc. 2d 839, 386 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1976).
43 This discussion only concerns contractual waivers of exemption rights in personal
property. Exemption rights have been deemed "waived" for a number of other reasons,
including: (I) failure to file a required exemption schedule, Andrews v. Briggs, 203 Ark. 714,
715, 158 S.W.2d 269, 270 (1942); (2) failure to timely claim the exemption, Ferrara v. Polito,
167 So. 120 (La. App. 1936); Blaylock v. J. Rubel & Co., 119 So. 503 (Miss. 1928); (3) failure
to specifically identify the property in which the exemption is claimed, Barfield & Reynolds
Banking Co., 40 Ga. App. 305, 149 S.E. 302 (1929); (4) failure to claim exemptions in debtor's
answer or at trial, Bow v. Hodges, 101 S.W.2d 1043 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); (5) failure to assert
the exemption prior to sale under levy, Barnhart Bros. & Spindler v. Dollarhide, 186 S.W. 564
(Mo. 1916); or (6) voluntarily placing exempt chattels on rented premises where the landlord
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unsecured creditors45 can obtain satisfaction upon default. In the
nineteenth century, state exemption statutes greatly expanded debtor
protections.46 This expansion prompted creditors to condition the
extension of credit upon the debtor's waiver of exemption rights.47
From an early date prospective exemption waivers were challenged
as repugnant to public policy. 48 Many of the early exemption waiver
decisions49 struggled with the conflict between freedom of contract
is entitled to distrain personal property of the tenant as security for payment of back rent,
Howard v. Calhoun, 155 Fla. 689, 21 So. 2d 361 (1945).
In addition, several states expressly make the benefits of exemption statutes unavailable
to a debtor who is leaving the state or who has absconded. OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 31, § 3
(West 1976); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 6.16.070 (1963 & Supp. 1980). Debtors who have
purchased potentially exempt assets with funds obtained by fraud may not claim the benefit
of the exemption against the defrauded parties. Vukowich, supra note 10, at 865-66.
Finally, there are categories of indebtedness which in every state may be collected from
otherwise exempt property. Family support obligations, the purchase price of exempt goods,
mechanics' and materialmen's liens on exempt property and taxes most often may be
collected in spite of exemption claims. For a comprehensive discussion of debts exempted
from the application of exemption statutes, see Vukowich,supra note 10, at 853-63. Cases and
authorities regarding the validity of prospective exemption waivers are collected in Annot., 94
A.L.R.2d 967 (1964).
44 The purpose of the present discussion is to examine the rationales which lead courts to
hold exemption waivers unenforceable and to demonstrate that state exemption policies are
frustrated by permitting the enforcement of security interests in all exempt property.
45 This section examines exemption waivers received by creditors who at the time of the
initial transaction obtained no security interest in specific assets of the debtor. See note 29
supra. Exemption statutes insulate assets from attachment and execution,supra note 6. These
remedies are available to creditors after initiation ofjudicial proceedings. Absent extraordi-
nary circumstances, however, a court will grant these remedies only after judgment. See
North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1967).
46 See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
47 Most often, at the time of the extension of credit the creditor obtained a promise from
the debtor not to assert exemption rights through a clause contained in the body of a promis-
sory note or other instrument. See Industrial Loan & Inv. Co. v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. 546,
209 P. 360 (1922); Brenau College v. Mincey, 68 Ga. App. 137, 22 S.E.2d 322 (1942); Curtis v.
O'Brien & Sears, 20 Iowa 376 (1866).
48 See, e.g., Carter's Adm'rs v. Carter, 20 Fla. 558, 563-71, 51 Am. Rep. 618, 619-23
(1894). Teague v. Weeks, 89 Miss, 360,42 So. 172 (1906); Weaver v. Lynch, 79 Colo. 537, 246
P. 789 (1926); Howell v. Robertson, 197 N.C. 572, 150 S.E. 32 (1929); Dennis v: Smith, 125
Ohio St. 120, 180 N.E. 638 (1932).
49 The early cases in this area were decided before the enactment of statutes proscribing
enforcement of prospective exemption waivers. These decisions were based solely upon the
courts' interpretation of the policy behind the exemption laws. E.g., Wallingford v. Bennett,
I Mackey 303 (D.C. 1881); Moxley v. Ragan, 73 Ky. (10 Bush) 156, 19 Am. Rep. 61 (1874);
Kneettle v. Newcomb, 22 N.Y. 249, 78 Am. Dec. 186 (1860); Slyfield v. Willard, 43 Wash.
179, 86 P. 392 (1906); Maxwell v. Reed, 7 Wis. 493 (1859). Some states later enacted statutes
invalidating prospective exemption waivers. E.g., ALA. CODE § 6-10-126 (1977) (as to speci-
fied personalty); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1132 (Supp. 1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1101
(1979) (limiting right to waive exemption); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4401 (1980);
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and this peculiar brand of social welfare legislation. In challenging
waivers, debtors sought more than the enforcement of their statutory
rights; 50 they sought to be protected from the consequences of their
own bargains.51
Most courts concluded that enforcement of prospective waivers
would frustrate the policies underlying debtors' exemptions.52 Penn-
sylvania was the only jurisdiction in which prospective exemption
waivers enjoyed the enduring approval of the courts in the absence of
a constitutional53 or legislative54 mandate.5 5 In Case v. Dunmore56 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held prospective waivers of debtors
rights enforceable under freedom of contract principles.57 Notwith-
standing expressions of doubt as to the wisdom of this decision, 58
Pennsylvania courts followed the rule of Case v. Dunmore for more
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550-37(4), (19) (West Cum. Supp. 1980) (limiting waiver availability
and requiring explicit disclosures prior to executing waivers); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-
5813.1 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.661(B) (Page 1981); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 8122 (Purdon Supp. 1981); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 31, § 1851 (Supp. 1979); S.C. CONST. art.
III, § 28 (fifth proviso); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-23-11 (Supp. 1981); VA. CODE § 34-22 (1976
& Cum. Supp. 1981) (limiting extent of permissible waivers); W. VA. CODE § 38-8-15 (Cum.
Supp. 1980).
50 Exemption statutes merely protect certain assets from attachment and execution.
They do not purport to limit debtors' freedom to bargain away exemption rights in return for
valuable consideration. See note 49 supra.
51 In several cases debtors have challenged the consensual character of transactions di-
minishing their exemption rights. Hernandez v. S.I.C. Fin. Co., 79 N.M. 673, 448 P.2d 474
(1968); State v. AVCO Fin. Servs., 50 N.Y.2d 383, 406 N.E.2d 1075, 429 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1980).
See notes 238-44 infia and accompanying text.
52 See notes 69-88 infra and accompanying text.
53 Alabama's constitution expressly provides for recognition and enforcement of prospec-
tive waivers. See ALA. CONST. art. X, §§ 204, 205, 210.
54 A few states by statute permit prospective waivers. ALA. CODE §§ 6-10-120, 6-10-121,
6-10-126 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1981) (supplementing constitutional provision); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 4912 (1975) (spouses must execute jointly); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1101 (1979)
(providing for partial waiver of state's constitutional homestead exemption); MD. COURTS
AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS CODE ANN. § 11-506 (1980); VA. CODE § 34-22 (1976) (limited
right of waiver).
55 See, e.g., Front and Huntingdon Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Berzinski, 130 Pa. Super. 297,
196 A. 572 (1938); Case v. Dunmore, 23 Pa. 93 (1854). See generaly Graubart, Waiver of Debt-
ors'Exemptions in Pennsylvania, 48 DICK. L. REv. 130 (1943). Case v. Dunmore and its progeny
were overruled by Mayhugh v. Coon, 460 Pa. 128, 331 A.2d 452 (1975).
56 23 Pa. 93 (1854).
57 Notwithstanding the benevolent provisions of the statute in favor of unfortunate
and thoughtless debtors, it was far from the intention of the legislature to deprive
the free citizens ... of the right, upon due deliberation, to make their own con-
tracts in their own way, in regard to securing the payment of debts honestly due.
Creditors are still recognized as having some rights: and it was not the intention of
the legislature to destroy them by impairing the obligation of contracts.
Id at 93-95. See also Bowman v. Smiley, 31 Pa. 225, 226-27 (1858).
58 In Shelly's Appeal, 36 Pa. 373 (1860), the court commented:
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than one hundred years. As judicial enthusiasm for enforcing waiv-
ers declined,59 however, Pennsylvania appellate courts refused to an-
alyze exemption waivers as matters of pure contract law. Instead the
courts viewed waivers as the surrender of rights based in a strong
public interest. As a result waivers were strictly construed 6o and en-
forced only if shown to be voluntary and knowing.61
In 1975, in Mayhugh v. Coon 62 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
overruled Case v. Dunmore and its progeny.63 The court held that the
provisions of Pennsylvania's debtor exemption statute6 4 "may not be
waived either expressly or by implication. ' 65 After discussing exemp-
tion policy,66 the court concluded that enforcement of exemption
waivers made retention of debtors' exemption rights the exception
rather than the rule.67 The court found this to be an "unreasonable
and absurd" result. In 1976 the holding of Mayhugh v. Coon was codi-
fied by the Pennsylvania legislature.68
Early decisions disapproving prospective exemption waivers
Perhaps it would have been well, if the court had set out by denying the capac-
ity of the debtor to waive the statutory exemption in favor of any creditor.
36 Pa. at 380, quoted in Mayhugh v. Coon, 460 Pa. 128, 136, 331 A.2d 452, 456 n.5 (1975)
(emphasis deleted). See also O'Nail v. Craig, 56 Pa. 161, 162 (1867); Firmstone v. Mach, 49
Pa. 387, 393 (1865).
59 The Pennsylvania appellate court's dissatisfaction with the precedent enforcing waiv-
ers was apparent in Resolute Ins. Co. v. Pennington, 423 Pa. 472, 224 A.2d 757 (1966). In
that case the court refused to enforce a prospective waiver of exemption rights conferred by a
separate statutory exemption provision for proceeds of an insurance policy.
60 Front & Huntingdon Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Berzinski, 130 Pa. Super. 297, 302, 196 A.
572, 574 (1938).
61 Transnational Consumer Discount Co. v. Kefauver, 224 Pa. Super. 475, 477, 307 A.2d
303, 305 (1973). This view of waivers was not limited to Pennsylvania, e.g., Flaxman v. Capi-
tol City Press, 121 Conn. 423, 185 A. 417 (1936). But see Broadway v. Household Fin. Corp.,
351 So.2d 1373, 1377 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977) (refusing to require clear and convincing proof of
waiver).
62 460 Pa. 128, 331 A.2d 452 (1975).
63 See id. at 132, 331 A.2d at 454 n.3.
64 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8123 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
65 460 Pa. at 138, 331 A.2d at 457.
66 Id. at 133, 331 A.2d at 454.
67 Id. at 135, 331 A.2d at 455.
68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8122 (Purdon Supp. 1981) provides: "Exemptions
from attachment or execution granted by statute may not be waived by the debtor by express
or implied contract before or after the commencement of the matter, the entry ofjudgment or
otherwise."
The Pennsylvania statute protects the debtor more comprehensively than most other
statutes. By forbidding waivers "before or after. . . judgment" the Pennsylvania statute
proscribes even those waivers made after levy or execution. Cf. notes 78-80 infla and accom-
panying text. The prohibition of "implied" waivers extends to grants of security interests in
exempt property. See Beneficial Consumer Discount Co. v. Hanlin, 263 Pa. Super. 393, 398
A.2d 193, 202 (1979).
[Vol. 57:215]
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
generally stressed legislative concern for the plight of debtors' fami-
lies. 69 Permitting the debtor to bargain away rights intended to pro-
tect his dependents would arguably base the statutory protections
upon an undependable foundation. In Kneettle v. Newcomb,70 the New
York Court of Appeals commented:
Every honest man who contracts a debt expects to pay it, and be-
lieves he will be able to do so without having his property sold on
execution. No one worthy of credit would, therefore, be apt to ob-
ject to a clause subjecting all of his property to levy an execution in
case of nonpayment. It was against the consequences of this over-
confidence, and the readiness of men to make contracts which may
deprive them and their families of articles indispensible to their
comfort, that the legislature has undertaken to interpose.71
The Florida Supreme Court commented that if prospective waivers
were enforced, "thoughtless and improvident" debtors might waive
their exemption benefits to obtain credit, "thus placing the last blan-
ket and bed of their own and their children's clothing at the mercy of
a hard creditor. '72
Contemporary exemption statutes continue to stress family pro-
69 See, e.g., Recht v. Kelley, 82 Ill. 147, 148 (1876); Moxley v. Ragan, 73 Ky. (10 Bush)
156, 157, 19 Am. Rep. 61-62 (1874); Dean v. McMullen, 109 Ohio St. 309, 315-19, 142 N.E.
683, 685-86 (1924).
70 22 N.Y. 249, 78 Am. Dec. 186 (1860).
71 Id. at 250, 78 Am. Dec. at 186-87.
72 Carter's Adm'rs v. Carter, 20 Fla. 558, 570, 51 Am. Rep. 618, 623 (1884). The court
stated that a debtor would be less likely to place himself and his family in financial straits
through execution of chattel mortgages granting creditors interests in specific items of exempt
personalty. Id. See note 74 infla.
Not every court has focused on family welfare. Language in a number of opinions char-
acterize exemption rights as "personal" to the debtor and, therefore, waivable by him. See,
e.g., Andrews v. Briggs, 203 Ark. 714, 716, 158 S.W.2d 269, 270 (1942); Lawrence v. Commer-
cial Banking Corp., 165 Md. 559, 561, 169 A. 69, 70 (1933); Barnhardt Bros. & Spindler v.
Dollarhide, 186 S.W. 564 (Mo. 1916); Sorensen v. City Nat'l Bank, 293 S.W. 638 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1927). Most statements concerning the personal nature of exemption rights, however,
have been made in opinions considering (1) waivers given at the time of levy or thereafter,
e.g., Barnhard Bros. &Spindler v. Dollarhide; (2) failures to comply with statutory procedures to
claim exemptions, e.g., Andrews v. Bnggs; (3) waivers as to specific articles executed by chattle
mortgage or security agreement, e.g., Aetna Fin. Co. v. Antoine, 343 So. 2d 1195 (La. App.
1977); or (4) state statutory or constitutional provisions permitting executory waivers, e.g.,
Lawrence v. Commercial Banking Corp., 165 Md. 559, 169 A. 69 (1933).
In Virginia, executory waivers are expressly permitted by statute except as to certain
specified property. VA. CODE § 34-22 (1976). Waivers have been considered to further the
goal of family protection. "The true interests and the real benefit to the family is . . . to
utilize the property exempted and make it the basis of credit." Reed v. Union Bank, 70 Va.




tection. 73 Recent cases invalidating prospective exemption waivers
cite family protection as an interest of paramount importance in
state exemption schemes. 74 Indeed, jurisdictions that have otherwise
disapproved prospective exemption waivers have enforced them
when a debtor without family or dependents has waived the benefit
of the exemption laws for himself alone. 75
Another concern evident in decisions striking down prospective
exemption waivers is the ease with which such waivers can be ob-
tained. If waivers were enforceable, exemption rights would rou-
tinely be defeated by the addition of a few simple words to every
contract or promissory note. 76 The New York Court of Appeals
commented:
A few words contained in any note or obligation would operate to
change the law between those parties and so far disappoint the in-
tentions of the legislature. If effect is given to such provisions, it is
likely that they will generally be inserted in obligations for all small
demands, and in that way the policy of the law will be completely
overthrown. 77
While the courts generally agreed on the policy reasons support-
ing non-enforcement of exemption waivers, the legal rationales devel-
oped to justify their non-enforcement decisions varied greatly.
Several early opinions held that exemption rights could be waived by
executory contract because the right to claim exemptions did not
arise until a writ of attachment had been issued and levy had been
attempted.7 8 In dictum these opinions indicated that an exemption
waiver would be effective if given at the time of levy.7 9 Upon levy
the exemption right becomes presently assertable and, therefore, ca-
73 See note 13 sufira.
74 See Anaconda Fed. Credit Union v. West, 157 Mont. 175, 179-80, 483 P.2d 909, 912
(1971); Mayhugh v. Coon, 460 Pa. 128, 134, 331 A.2d 452, 455 (1975); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Parr, 189 Kan. 475, 370 P.2d 400 (1962).
75 Compare Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Parr, 189 Kan. 475, 370 P.2d 400 (1962) with Schloss v.
Unsell, 114 Kan. 69, 216 P. 1091 (1923) and Curtis v. O'Brien & Sears, 20 Iowa 376, 89 Am.
Dec. 543 (1866) with In re Kline's Estate, 237 Iowa 1086, 24 N.W.2d 481 (1946).
76 See Carter's Adm'rs v. Carter, 20 Fla. 558, 570 (1884) ("by the mere scratch of a pen
the whole policy of the exemption laws would become nugatory"); Wallingsford v. Bennett, 1
Mackey 303, 310 (D.C. 1881) ("If the legislature had not intended this law to be observed in
the interest of public welfare, it never would have been enacted, and parties would have been
left where the law found them, to exercise their personal discretion in the disposition of the
subject by contract.").
77 Kneettle v. Newcomb, 22 N.Y. 249, 250, 78 Am. Dec. 186, 187-88 (1860).
78 E.g., Harper v. Leal, 10 How. Pr. 276 (N.Y. 1854); Branch & Co. v. Tomlinson, 77
N.C. 388 (1877).
79 Harper v. Leal, id. at 283-84; Branch & Co. v. Tomlinson, id. at 390-91. See also Malo-
ney v. Newton, 85 Ind. 565, 566, 44 Am. Rep. 47, 47 (1882) ("where the right of exemption
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pable of being relinquished. Additionally, when the sheriff has as-
serted dominion over the property, at the time of levy, the debtor can
immediately perceive the consequences of waiving his exemption
rights.80
Another line of early decisions indicated that the character of
the debtor's ownership rights in exempt assets precluded him from
bargaining away his rights by prospective waiver. In some cases, the
debtor was characterized as a trustee holding property for the benefit
of his family.8' In other cases, the court considered that the statutory
exemption deprived the debtor of the power to dispossess his family
of basic assets by agreeing with a creditor to make exempt property
available upon execution.8 2
Nineteenth century courts were uncomfortable with outright re-
strictions upon an individual's right to freely enter commercial con-
tracts. As a result, some courts described their refusal to enforce
exemption waivers as a restriction on creditors' ability to collect their
debts.8 3 Courts were more comfortable with this characterization
than with an express limitation on freedom of contract. The ration-
ale, however, overlooked the essence of the policy behind exemption
statutes. Stated simply, the law would not permit debtors to bargain
away their exemption rights. Rarely did an opinion straightfor-
wardly acknowledge that exemption policies resulted in a direct re-
straint on both freedom of contract and debtors' property rights.8 4
exists it cannot be waived by contract prior to the issuing of the execution"); Maxwell v.
Reed, 7 Wis. 493, 498 (1859).
80 See Kneettle v. Newcomb, 22 N.Y. 249, 78 Am. Dec. 116 (1860). The Kneettle coart
held an exemption waiver contained in a promissory note void as contrary to public policy.
The court expressly distinguished a prospective waiver from a waiver given at the time of levy
when the debtor relinquishes an identified asset as part of the transaction. Id. at 251, 78 Am.
Dec. at 188. See also Curtis v. O'Brien, 20 Iowa 376, 377, 89 Am. Dec. 543, 544 (1866).
Other courts have alluded to the same distinction in comparing prospective waivers with
sales or mortgages of exempt property. See Carter's Adm'rs v. Carter, 20 Fla. 558, 570-71, 51
Am. Rep. 618, 623-24 (1884); Moxley v. Ragan, 73 Ky. (10 Bush) 156, 157-58, 19 Am. Rep.
61, 62-63 (1873); Morgan Plan Co. v. Ates, 8 La. App. 806, 809 (1928).
81 See, e.g., In re Trammel, 5 F.2d 326, 328 (N.D. Ga. 1925).
82 Kneettle v. Newcomb, 22 N.Y. 249, 252-53, 78 Am. Dec. 186, 189-90 (1860).
83 See, e.g., Industrial Loan & Inv. Co. v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. 546, 209 P. 360 (1922);
Carter's Adm'rs v. Carter, 20 Fla. 558, 570, 51 Am. Rep. 618, 623 (1884); Kneettle v. New-
comb, 22 N.Y. 249, 251, 78 Am. Dec. 186, 187 (1860).
84 In Kneettle v. Newcomb, 22 N.Y. 249, 78 Am. Dec. 186 (1860), the court recognized
that exemption laws deny the debtor the power to make certain agreements disposing of
family assets. Id. at 252-53, 71 Am. Dec. at 189-90. In Carter's Adm'rs v. Carter, 20 Fla. 558,
51 Am. Rep. 618 (1884) the court stated:
The object of the exemption laws is to protect people of limited means and their
families in the enjoyment of so much property as may be necessary to prevent abso-
lute pauperism and want, and against the consequences of ill advised promises
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In refusing to enforce exemption waivers the courts were con-
cerned with the impact of waivers on debtors, their families, and soci-
ety. Unfortunately the courts' concern focused on the form rather
than the substance of the transactions in question. At the same time
that the courts were refusing to enforce prospective waivers, debtors
were consistently held to be fully capable of granting security inter-
ests in exempt property. 5 Full realization of the public policy be-
hind exemption statutes, however, requires that the courts analyze
transactions which diminish debtors' exemption rights in light of
their practical effect.
A review of the waiver cases fails to reveal a consistent judicial
viewpoint regarding either the nature of the debtors' exemption
rights or the restrictions which should be imposed on the debtors'
ability to bargain them away.86 The courts, while preventing loss of
exemption rights by contractual waiver, have repeatedly held that
exemption laws do not prevent the debtor from selling, encumbering,
or otherwise disposing of exempt property. The "no-waiver" doc-
trine has encouraged the use of arrangements creating security inter-
ests in debtors' exempt property.87 The results, in many cases, are no
more consonant with public policy than those reached when prospec-
which their lack ofjudgment and discretion may have led them to make, or which
they may have been induced to enter into by the persuasions of others.
Id. at 569, 51 Am. Rep. at 623-24. See also Mayhugh v. Coon, 460 Pa. 128, 135, 331 A.2d 452,
455 (1975) (legislative intention to protect debtors against their own "thoughtlessness" and
"extravagence").
85 See cases cited in note 83 supra.
86 Even jurisdictions that continue to enforce exemption waivers recognize that full free-
dom to waive exemption rights is undesirable. Alabama, by express constitutional provision,
permits prospective waivers. The waivers, however, may not extend to designated household
goods, wearing apparel, essential business property used by the debtor and the debtor's per-
sonal library. ALA. CONST. art. 10, §§ 204, 205, 210; ALA. CODE § 6-10-126 (1977). Georgia
has enacted three separate exemption schemes for real and personal property, the "constitu-
tional homestead," GA. CODE ANN. § 51-101 (1979); an alternative "statutory or short home-
stead," id. § 51-1301; and a special bankruptcy exemption, id. § 51-1301.1 (Cum. Supp.
1981). The "constitutional homestead" exempts $5,000 of realty and personalty and may be
waived as to all exempt assets except $300 worth of household and kitchen furniture and
provisions." Id. § 51-1101 (1979). The "statutory or short homestead" exemption may be
waived before, but not after exempt property has been set apart (by application to probate
court and publication of a schedule of assets claimed as exempt under id. § 51-1401). In re
Trammel, 5 F.2d 326 (N.D. Ga. 1925). The Georgia bankruptcy exemption contains no ex-
press language concerning waivers, but such waivers will not be enforced in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(e).
87 See COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA (1974):
After 1800 the chattel mortgage, a method of lending on the security of personal
property became increasingly common. By the [1850's] it was being supplemented
by the conditional sales contract, which gave the seller the right to repossess the
goods if the buyer failed to meet all of the installment payments.
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tive waivers were enforced.88
IV. Nonpossessory Nonpurchase-money Security Interests In
Exempt Personal Property
A. Introduction
Early interpretations of exemption statutes made it clear that
most jurisdictions intended to restrict the debtor's ability to dispose
of his exemption rights by contractual waiver.8 9 The debtor was not
permitted to waive his exemption rights because: (1) the waiver
might be given without a full appreciation of its consequences;90 and
(2) waivers have a detrimental impact upon the welfare of debtors'
families9' and the state.92 The "no-waiver" rule meant that public
policy imposed restrictions on freedom of contract and a concomit-
tant diminution of the debtor's right to dispose of exempt property.93
The courts, however, generally permitted debtors to bargain
away the rights protected by the "no-waiver" rule through the execu-
tion of chattel mortgages or security agreements granting nonposses-
sory, nonpurchase-money security interests in exempt assets. 94
Today by statutory or constitutional provision, most states enforce
security interests in exempt property.95 The next section examines
the historical rationale leading to the distinct treatment accorded ex-
emption waivers as opposed to chattel mortgages or security agree-
ments. The extent to which nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money
Id. at 261. Such devices permitted creditors to reach exempt assets while avoiding the en-
forcement problems of exemption waivers.
88 See text accompanying note 111 infra.
89 Some decisions disapproved exemption waivers on the ground that they would
"change the law between those parties." These courts recognized that exemption policy im-
posed limits on freedom of contract. Kneettle v. Newcomb, 22 N.Y. 249, 250, 78 Am. Dec.
186, 187-88 (1860). Seealso Carter's Adm'rs v. Carter, 20 Fla. 558, 570-71, 51 Am. Rep. 618,
623-24 (1884). The essence of any contract is a consensual agreement by which the parties
alter the legal rights and obligations existing between them.
90 See notes 78-80 supra and accompanying text.
91 See notes 69-76 supra and accompanying text.
92 Exemption laws were intended to prevent the addition of debtors' families to the wel-
fare rolls. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
93 The "no waiver" rule reduces the debtor's borrowing power by limiting the types of
assets to which a creditor may look for repayment. See note 45 supra. This diminution of
property rights and borrowing power can be overcome in part by granting security interests
in exempt property. The impact of enforcing security interests in exempt property, however,
may be equally at odds with exemption policy.
94 The most striking example of the frustration of exemption policy through such devices
is the "catch-all" collateral clause, supra note 39. See notes 218-19, 229 infra and accompany-
ing text.
95 See authorities cited in note 36 supra.
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security interests in exempt personalty can be enforced without con-
travention of the policy behind debtor exemption statutes is also
considered.
B. Prospective Waiver Versus Securzy Interest
Although courts refuse to enforce exemption waivers, their opin-
ions consistently state that exemption laws do not restrict the debtor's
right to dispose of his property.96 A debtor's right to sell97 or give
away98 exempt personalty has never been seriously questioned. For
many courts, the debtor's right to sell exempt assets logically implies
that exempt assets may also be freely encumbered. 99 While the logic
is appealing, the result is inconsistent with exemption policy. 100
The opinions that discuss the distinction between the encum-
brance of exempt assets and exemption waivers consider exemption
statutes not to be so "paternalistic" as to impose restrictions upon
debtors' rights to dispose of their property as they choose.' 01 For ex-
ample, the Washington Supreme Court stated that "[t]o deny. the
96 See notes 37 & 38 supra and accompanying text.
97 See, e.g., Knight v. Addison, 49 Ga. App. 54, 56, 174 S.E. 145, 146 (1934); Kay v.
Furlow, 178 La. 637, 152 So. 315 (1934) ("No one would think of saying that the owner of
these exempted things could not sell them.'); United States Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Stevens, 93
Mont. 11, 17-18, 17 P.2d 62, 65 (1933); Hernandez v. S.I.C. Fin. Co., 79 N.M. 673, 675, 448
P.2d 474, 476 (1968); State v. AVCO Fin. Servs., 50 N.Y.2d 383, 388, 406 N.E.2d 1075, 1077,
429 N.Y.S.2d 181, 183-84 (1980); Montford v. Grohman, 37 N.C. App. 733, 736, 245 S.E.2d
219, 222 (1978); Congress Candy Co. v. Farmer, 73 N.D. 174, 12 N.W.2d 796, 803 (1944);
Frost v. Shaw, 3 Ohio St. 270, 272-73 (1854); Mutual Loan & Thrift Corp. v. Corn, 182 Tenn.
554, 556 188 S.W.2d 345, 345-46 (1945). Sales of exempt property, assuming they are made
at a fair price, do not immediately reduce the net worth of the debtor's assets.
98 Muntford v. Grohman, 36 N.C. App. 733, 736, 245 S.E.2d 219, 222 (1978). Gifts of
exempt property have been challenged by creditors who have alleged them to be fraudulent.
Courts have held gifts of exempt property permissible because unencumbered exempt prop-
erty would not be available to satisfy indebtedness on execution. E.g., New Amsterdam Cas.
Co. v. Wailer, 323 F.2d 20 (4th Cir. 1963). It is difficult to imagine a challenge to a gift of
exempt property arising in other circumstances.
99 E.g., State v. AVCO Fin. Servs., 50 N.Y.2d 383, 406 N.E.2d 1075, 429 N.Y.S.2d 181
(1980).
No statute precludes exempt property from being sold; nor is there any which ex-
pressly interdicts a less drastic step of encumbering such property. So, for example,
while contractual waivers of a debtor's statutory exemption are usually held to be
void. . . the law has not forbidden a debtor to execute a mortgage upon the prop-
erty so protected and thus create a lien which may be foreclosed despite the prop-
erty's exempt status. ...
Id. at 388, 406 N.E.2d at 1077, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 184. See also cases cited in note 97 supra.
100 See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
101 State v. AVCO Fin. Servs., 50 N.Y.2d 383, 388, 406 N.E.2d 1075, 1077, 429 N.Y.S.2d
181, 183-84 (1980); Montford v. Grohman, 36 N.C. App. 733, 736, 245 S.E.2d 219, 222-23
(1978).
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right to mortgage exempt property would be to deny its right of sale
or other disposition."'1 ° 2 The Tennessee Supreme Court opined that
limiting a debtor's power to encumber exempt assets presented a
greater threat to sound public policy than did enforcement of agree-
ments encumbering such assets. 0 3 Thus, enforcement of chattel
mortgages and security interests in exempt assets is considered neces-
sary to preserve debtors' rights to alienate their property.
In addition to upholding alienation rights, the courts have de-
veloped other rationales supporting the enforcement of security inter-
ests in exempt property. In the past some courts considered the
creation of security interests less threatening to debtors than exemp-
tion waivers.104 It was assumed that a debtor would be more likely to
consider the potential loss of exempt personalty if he renounced ex-
emption rights specifically by security agreement rather than gener-
ally by waiver. '0 5 The conclusion that the implied exemption waiver
contained in a chattel mortgage or security agreement was under-
taken knowingly by the debtor was fostered by the courts' perception
that the debtor had bargained for specific credit rights in exchange
for specific ownership and exemption rights in identified items of per-
sonal property. 106 Whatever may be said about the nature of debtor-
102 Cammarano v. Longmire, 99 Wash. 360, 362, 169 P. 806, 807 (1918). See also Kay v.
Furlow, 178 La. 637, 642, 152 So. 315, 317 (1934).
103 Mutual Loan & Thrift Corp. v. Corn, 182 Tenn. 554, 188 S.W.2d 345 (1945).
[S]ound public policy would rather be defeated by an invasion of the right of the
absolute owner to alienate his property and. . . it is sound public policy to provide
that the thrift and responsible head of a family shall have the right to borrow in an
emergency, funds for the support of his family, than that the improvident should be
protected."
Id. at 557, 188 S.W.2d at 346. See also Mynatt v. Magill, 71 Tenn. 72, 74 (1879).
104 See, e.g., Industrial Loan & Inv. Co. v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. 546, 209 P. 360 (1922);
Carter's Adm'rs v. Carter, 20 Fla. 558, 570, 51 Am. Rep. 618, 623 (1884); Kneettle v. New-
comb, 22 N.Y. 249, 251, 78 Am. Dec. 186, 187 (1860).
105 Morgan Plan Co. v. Ates, 8 La. App. 806, 809 (1928). See also Carter's Adm'rs v.
Carter, 20 Fla. 558, 569-70, 51 Am. Rep. 618,623 (1884); Kneettle v. Newcomb, 22 N.Y. 249,
251, 78 Am. Dec. 186, 188 (1860).
106 See, e.g., Morgan Plan Co. v. Ates, 8 La. App. 806 (1928):
Without reviewing them in detail, we think [the cases disapproving prospective
waivers] all either depend on the particular provisions of the statute law which they
interpret, or if they formulate a doctrine, simply teach that a general renunciation
of the right to claim the benefit of homestead or exemption laws cannot be en-
forced. . . . [I]t does not meet the instant issue, which is not whether a general
renunciation of the right to claim the benefit of. . .exemption laws is binding, but
whether a special renunciation as to particular property can be enforced. The dif-
ference between the two cases is self evident; the one being a divestiture on the part
of the debtor of his right to claim the benefits of the laws of the land as to his
present and future property, the other being simply the exercise of his power of
ownership over the particular property the subject of a particular contract.
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creditor relations at the time this view was enunciated, it no longer
comports with commercial reality. 0 7 Today credit transactions com-
monly include catch-all or "dragnet" collateral clauses making the
debtor's exempt and nonexempt personalty subject to the creditor's
security interest. 0 8 Moreover, the courts have consistently enforced
security interests in exempt property even under circumstances indi-
cating that the debtor had no appreciation of the legal significance of
his acts.109
Another reason the courts have given for upholding security in-
terests in exempt personalty is a concern for potential fraud on credi-
tors. It is argued that debtors, having bargained away their
exemption rights, should not be able to avoid the consequences of
their contracts to the detriment of unsuspecting creditors."10 Such
concerns seem inapposite when the creditor, rather than the debtor,
is the party more likely to understand the exemption statute. This
continuing devotion to notions of formal contractual obligation is in-
appropriate where competing policies demand that exemption rights
be given due consideration."'
Id. at 809 (emphasis deleted). See also Congress Candy Co. v. Farmer, 73 N.D. 174, 190, 12
N.W.2d 796, 803 (1944); State v. AVCO Fin. Servs., 50 N.Y.2d 383, 388, 406 N.E.2d 1075,
1077, 429 N.Y.S.2d 181, 183-84 (1980); City Loan & Say. Co. v. Keenan, 136 Ohio St. 125,
129, 24 N.E.2d 452, 454 (1939).
107 See Mayhugh v. Coon, 460 Pa. 128, 137, 331 A.2d 452, 456 (1975).
108 See note 39 supra and notes 218-19, 228 infra and accompanying text.
109 Howard v. Calhoun, 155 Fla. 689, 21 So. 2d 361 (1945), examined the statutory land-
lord's lien. The lien attaches to a tenant's personal property to secure a claim for back rent.
The court concluded that a tenant could waive exemption rights in personalty by merely
moving into rental property protected by the statutory lien. A similar result was reached in
Tomson v. Lerner, 37 N.M. 546, 25 P.2d 209 (1933), which held that "[w]hen a tenant moves
into the premises of his landlord, by his own act he creates the lien in favor of the landlord,
and thereby waives his exemption as effectively as though he had granted a mortgage." Id. at
547-48, 25 P.2d at 210. See also Swan v. Bournes, 47 Iowa 501 (1877) (holding otherwise
exempt coat subject to innkeeper's common law lien, the act of renting a room being tanta-
mount to creating a chattel mortgage).
These cases consider the lien to have been created when the premises was rented and
personalty moved in. Thus, an implied waiver was given for all personalty on the premises
prior to default. If this was the case, the operation of the waiver was essentially indistinguish-
able from prospective contractual waivers condemned in other cases. See Section III supra. In
some jurisdictions, however, the landlord's lien does not attach to the tenant's exempt chat-
tels. E.g., Huebsch Mfg. Co. v. Coleman, 113 S.W.2d 639 kTex. Civ. App. 1938); Ray v. Cox,
83 Utah 499, 30 P.2d 1062 (1934).
110 See, e.g., Kay v. Furlow, 178 La. 637, 642, 152 So. 315, 317 (1933). This attitude has
had an influence on the development of debtor exemption law and was cited by Pennsylvania
courts enforcing prospective exemption waivers prior to Mayhugh v. Coon, 460 Pa. 128, 331
A.2d 452 (1975). Ste Graubart, Waiver of Debtors'Exemptions in Pennsylvania, 48 DICK. L. RV.
130 (1944).
111 Resolute Ins. Co. v. Pennington, 423 Pa. 472, 224 A.2d 757 (1966):
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C. Existing Limitations Upon Nonpossessoy, Nonpurchase-Mongy Security
Interests in Exempt Personalty
The majority of jurisdictions enforce nonpossessory, nonpur-
chase-money security interests in exempt personalty. 1 2 A few states,
however, limit their enforceability by statute1 3 or judicial deci-
sion.11 4 This section examines the various ways in which states have
limited a debtor's ability to waive his exemption rights through the
creation of security interests.
1. Joint Execution Requirements
Among the jurisdictions that enforce security interests in exempt
personalty many have required that the debtor, if married, obtain
the consent of his spouse before any encumbrance will be considered
valid."15 The requirement that both spouses must consent to create a
The argument that parties have a right to make their own contracts is not apposite
where a matter of sufficient public policy is at stake. Further, it is simplistic in the
instant situation. Provisions waiving the protection of all exemption laws customa-
rily appear as part and parcel as the printed form in notes, bonds, mortgages, and
the like. It is unrealistic to say that the parties have bargained at arm's length- in
such cases, where the creditor enjoys an almost impregnable position.
Id. at 478 n.2, 224 A.2d at 760 n.2. The same may be said of many clauses by which debtors
grant creditors security interests in exempt chattels. See, e.g., Hernandez v. S.I.C. Fin. Co., 79
N.M. 673, 448 P.2d 474 (1968); State v. AVCO Fin. Servs., 50 N.Y.2d 383, 406 N.E.2d 1075,
429 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1980); Montford v. Grohman, 36 N.C. App. 71, 245 S.E.2d 219 (1978).
112 See note 36 and Section IV B supra.
113 E.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4401 (1980) (setting forth specific items in which
the "right of exemption may not be waived, pledged or given as security or collateral," except
for their purchase price or for agricultural crop loans); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 550.37(4) (West.
Supp. 1980) (proscribing nonpossessory nonpurchase-money security interests as well as ex-
emption waivers in specified articles but providing for grants of security interests in limited
situations after disclosure) and 550.37(19) (proscribing exemption waivers in specified chattels
unless disclosure is made and the debtor signs a statement reflecting knowledge of the waiver's
consequences); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 399-A:7 (Supp. 1979) (prohibiting small loan com-
panies from taking security interests in exempt household furniture, and declaring'void any
agreement creating a security interest in exempt property); VA. CODE § 34-28 (1976) (voiding
deeds of trust or other instruments granting security interests in specified types of personalty).
114 E.g., Beneficial Consumer Discount Co. v. Hamlin, 263 Pa. Super. Ct. 393, 398 A.2d
193 (1979) (refusing enforcement of a security interest in property set aside as exempt in prior
bankruptcy); South Hill Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Hudson, 174 Va. 284, 6 S.E.2d 668 (1940)
(extending application of VA. CODE § 6564 (1919), now VA. CODE § 34-28) to exemptions
granted to households engaged in agriculture).
115 E.g., Welty v. Burks, 76 Colo. 365, 231 P. 660 (1924); Bruce v. Frame, 39 Idaho 29, 225
P. 1024 (1924); National Bank v. Chapman, 212 Iowa 561, 234 N.W. 198 (1931); Emporia
Wholesale Coffee Co. v. Rehrig, 173 Kan. 841, 252 P.2d 590 (1953); Tri-State Fin. Corp. v.
Surry, 139 So. 2d 100 (La. App. 1961); Schaub v. Welfare Fin. Corp., 65 Ohio App. 68, 29
N.E.2d 223 (1939); Parsons v. Kimmell, 206 Mich. 676, 173 N.W. 539 (1919); Opitz v. Brawl-
ey, 10 Wis. 2d 93, 102 N.W.2d 117 (1960). In the foregoing cases the courts enforced the
statutory requirement that spouses jointly execute instruments creating nonpossessory, non-
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security interest in exempt property is consistent with the family pro-
tection policy which prompted the enactment of exemption stat-
utes. 116 This requirement imposes both substantive and procedural
limitations on a debtor's ownership rights in exempt property. The
limitation is substantive in that the married owner of exempt prop-
erty is recognized as the trustee for his spouse and family." 7 The
owner is required to obtain the consent of his spouse, a primary bene-
ficiary of the exemption laws, before relinquishing exemption rights.
The restrictions are also procedural in that they require the spouse to
join in the execution of the instrument creating the security interest.
Joint execution requirements cannot be expected to adequately
safeguard exemption rights. Security interests in exempt personalty
are often granted under circumstances where the full impact of the
transaction is not apparent to the debtor." 8 The requirement that a
second party join the transaction is unlikely to prevent the unwise
release of exemption rights. In addition, the credit pressures felt by
one spouse will undoubtedly be felt by the other. It is unlikely that
the second spouse will be much more circumspect regarding the wis-
dom of the implied exemption waiver.
The object of exemption statutes is to preserve certain essential
assets for the debtor and his family. Permitting the creation of secur-
ity interests in exempt property, with or without a spouse's concur-
rence, is inconsistent with that purpose.11 9
2. The New Hampshire Small Loan Company Act
The New Hampshire Small Loan Company Act prohibits loan
companies from securing loans of $2,000 or less by accepting as col-
purchase-money encumbrances on exempt chattels. Joint execution was not required for cre-
ation of purchase-money security interests because the household was not relinquishing
exempt equity through the transaction. See Simpson v. McConnell, 228 Iowa 412, 291 N.W.
862 (1940). Today joint execution requirements are not generally found in state personal
property exemption laws. They are, however, numerous in real property exemption provi-
sions. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 480:5-a (1968); S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 43-31-17 (1969
& Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-301(b) & (c) (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-23-4(4)
(1977 & Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 6.12.100 (1963); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 815.20
(West 1977). Statutory provisions requiring joint spousal execution of agreements granting
security interests in exempt personalty are sometimes included in laws regulating the conduct
of only one group of potential secured creditors, such as small loan companies. E.g., ARIZ.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 6-630(A) & (B); VA. CODE § 6.1-289 (1979) (Small Loan Act).
116 National Bank v. Chapman, 212 Iowa 561, 234 N.W. 198, 199 (1931); Dean v. Mc-
Mullen, 109 Ohio St. 309, 315, 142 N.E. 683, 685-86 (1924).
117 See notes 81 & 82 su ra and accompanying text.
118 See notes 108 & 111 supra.
119 See note 116 supra and accompanying text.
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lateral "household furniture" used by the debtor.1 20 The Act renders
security interests in household furniture created in connection with
small loans "null and void."1 21
The New Hampshire statute provides only limited protection to
debtors. First, the state exemption statute narrowly defines the term
"household furniture."' 22 Thus, the restriction on small loan collat-
eral fails to protect exempt necessities such as wearing apparel, provi-
sions, fuel, books and tools of the debtor's trade. 23 Second, since
small loan companies are permitted to extend credit up to $5,000 a
large number of their transactions fall without the statutory restric-
tion on collateral.1 24 On loans larger than $2,000, even when the
outstanding balance falls below $2,000, household furniture remains
subject to the security interest. 25 Finally, limiting the types of collat-
eral that small loan companies can accept fails to protect debtors
120 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 399-A: 7 (Supp. 1979) provides in pertinent part:
I. No licensee shall be permitted to accept as collateral on a loan under this
chapter:
(a) Real estate, or
(b) Household furniture presently in use on loans of $2,000 or less.
II. Any agreement purporting to convey to a licensee a security interest in the
property listed in paragraph I shall be null and void.
121 Id. at § 399-A: 7(11).
122 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 511:2 (Supp. 1979) provides:
Eremptt'ons. The following goods and property are exempted from attachment
and execution:
I. The wearing apparel necessary for the use of the debtor and his family.
II. Comfortable beds, bedsteads and bedding necessary for the debtor, his
wife and children.
III. Household furniture to the value of one thousand dollars.
IV. One cooking stove and the necessary furniture belonging to the same.
V. One sewing machine, kept for use by the debtor or his family.
VI. Provisions and fuel to the value of two hundred dollars.
VII. The uniform, arms and equipments of every officer and private in the
militia.
VIII. The Bibles, school books and library of any debtor, used by him or his
family, to the value of four hundred dollars.
IX. Tools of his occupation to the value of six hundred dollars.
X. One hog and one pig, and the pork of the same when slaughtered.
XI. Six sheep and the fleeces of the same.
XII. One cow; a yoke of oxen or a horse, when required for farming or team-
ing purposes or other actual use; and hay not exceeding four tons.
XIII. Domestic fowls not exceeding one hundred and fifty dollars in value.
XIV. The debtor's interest is one pew in any meeting-house in which he or
his family usually worship.
XV. The debtor's interest is one lot or right of burial in any cementery.
123 Id.
124 Id. at § 399-A: 3.
125 Set note 42 supra.
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against similar security interests taken by other lenders. 126
3. Uniform Commercial Code
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code127 provides debtors
very limited protection against enforcement of security interests in
exempt chattels. Section 9-204 states that "a security agreement may
provide that collateral, whenever acquired, shall secure all obliga-
tions covered by the security agreement."1 28 Although the Code gen-
erally permits after-acquired property clauses, a creditor is
prohibited from acquiring a security interest in "consumer goods
. ..when given as additional security unless the debtor acquires
rights in them within ten days after the secured party gives value.' ' 129
The Code defines "consumer goods" as goods "used or bought
for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes."130
Consumer goods include a subitantial number of items generally pro-
tected by exemption laws, such as wearing apparel,' 3 ' household fur-
niture, 32 professionally prescribed health aids, 3 3 and sewing
machines. 134 Under the Code, creditors are permitted to take secur-
ity interests in exempt property possessed by the debtor on the date
of the transaction or acquired within ten days thereafter, but are not
permitted to extend such security interests to exempt consumer goods
later acquired by the debtor. These provisions merely place a tempo-
ral limit on the acquisition of security interests in some exempt prop-
erty. The Code fails to comprehensively or effectively shield basic
necessities from the reach of pressing creditors in a way consonant
126 The New Hampshire statute regulating small loan companies does not regulate the
operation of banks, credit unions and savings and loan associations. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 399A: 2 (Supp. 1979).
127 3 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 103 (1976).
128 U.C.C. § 9-204(l).
129 U.C.C. § 9-204(2).
130 U.C.C. § 9-109(1).
131 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.35.080(3) (Cum. Supp. 1980); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 33-1125(1) (Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-352b(a) (West Supp. 1981); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 651-121(1) (Supp. 1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 513.435(2) (Vernon Supp. 1981).
132 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1123 (Supp. 1980); CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE
§ 690.1 (West 1980); IDAHO CODE § 11-605(I)(a) (1979); KY. REv. STAT. § 427.010 (Cum.
Supp. 1980).
133 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 690.5 (West 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
352b() (West Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE § 11-603(2) (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-23-5(2)
(Supp. 1981).
134 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 627.6(15). (West 1950); MAsS. ANN. LAWs ch. 235,
§ 34(12) (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-23-5(7) (Supp.
1981).
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with the basic aims of exemption laws. 135
4. Statutory Protection of Exempt Chattels Against Consensual
Liens
The Maine exemption statute provides that specified categories
of personalty are exempt up to certain value limitations. The
debtor's "right of exemption may not be waived, pledged or given as
security or collateral other than for the purchase thereof . ".. 16
135 Items such as tools of the debtor's trade are generally protected by exemption statutes
as essential to debtor rehabilitation. See G. PENDLETON, DEBTORS' EXEMPTIONS IN PENN-
SYLVANIA 18 (1886), supra note 14; Mayhugh v. Coon, 460 Pa. 128, 134, 331 A.2d 452, 455
(1975). Tools of trade fall outside the Code's definition of consumer goods. Arguably, tools of
trade could be considered goods purchased for personal use; however, the U.C.C. defines
"equipment" as goods "used or bought for use primarily in business . . . ." U.C.C. § 9-
109(2). The Official Comment to § 9-109 states that the categories of equipment and con-
sumer goods are mutually exclusive. 3 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 197 (1981).
136 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4401 (1980) provides as follows:
The following personal property is exempt from attachment and execution and
such right of exemption may not be waived, pledged or given as security or collat-
eral, except as security for the purchase thereof and except for agricultural crop
loans on produce of farms until harvested:
1. Apparel, household furniture and goods, bed. The debtor's apparel; the
debtor's interest, not to exceed $1,000, in household furniture and goods necessary
for himself, his spouse and children; one bed, bedstead and necessary bedding for
each such person; one radio and one television not exceeding $200 in total values
and the debtor's interest, not to exceed $1,000, in one motor vehicle, as defined in
Title 29, section 1, subsection 7;
2. Bibles, statutes, watch, ring. All family portraits, Bibles and school books
in actual use in the family; one copy of the statutes of the State, a library not
exceeding $150 in value, a watch not exceeding $50 in value and a wedding ring
and an engagement ring not exceeding $200 in value;
3. Pew. All his interest in one pew in a meeting house where he and his
family statedly worship;
4. Stoves, coal, wood. One cooking stove; all iron stoves used exclusively for
warming buildings; charcoal, and not exceeding 12 cords of wood conveyed to his
house for the use of himself and family; all anthracite coal, not exceeding 5 tons; all
bituminous coal, not exceeding 50 bushels; $50 worth of lumber, wood or bark; all
heating gas, fuel oil and kerosene, not exceeding $200 in value, for use of the debtor
and his family for heating and cooking purposes;
5. Farm procedure. All produce of farms until harvested; one barrel of flour;
50 bushels of oats; 50 barrels of potatoes; corn and grain necessary for himself and
family, not exceeding 30 bushels; all other food provisions raised or bought and
necessary for himself and family; and all flax raised on a half acre of land and all
articles manufactured therefrom for the use of himself and family;
6. Trade tools, sewing machine, refrigerator, washing machine, musical in-
struments. The debtor's interest, not to exceed $1,000, in the tools necessary for his
trade or occupation, including power tools, materials and stock designed and pro-
cured by him and necessary for carrying on his trade or business and intended to be
used or wrought therein; one sewing machine, one refrigerator and one washing
machine not exceeding $200 each in value for actual use by himself or family; the
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Simply stated, Maine debtors and creditors are precluded from using
certain categories of personal property as collateral other than for its
purchase price.13 7 Exempt personalty, therefore, is no longer a factor
in assessing a debtor's creditworthiness.13 8
The Maine exemption statute could be criticized as a paternalis-
tic exercise in social welfare legislation.139 The statute inhibits free-
dom of contract, strips debtors of property rights, 40 and deprives
musical instruments used by him in his profession as a professional musician, not
exceeding $200 in value;
7. Cattle, mules, horses, harness, sled. One pair of working cattle, or instead
thereof one pair of mules or one or 2 horses not exceeding in value $400, and a
sufficient quantity of hay to keep them through the season. If he has more than one
pair of working cattle or mules, or if the 2 horses exceed in value $400, he may elect
which pair of cattle or mules or which horse shall be exempt. If he has a pair of
mules or one or 2 horses so exempt, he may also have exempt for each of said horses
or mules, one harness not exceeding $40 in value; and one horse sled not exceeding
the same value; but if he has at the same time an ox sled, he may elect which sled
shall be exempt;
8. Domestic fowl, cow, swine, sheep. Domestic fowl not exceeding $100 in
value, 2 swine, one cow and one heifer under 3 years old and the calves raised from
them until they are one year old, or if he has no oxen, horse or mule, 2 cows, and he
may elect the cows or cow and heifer, if he has more than are exempt, 10 sheep and
the wool from them and the Iambs raised from them until they are one year old,
and a sufficient quantity of hay to keep said cattle, sheep and lambs through the
winter season;
9. Farm equipment. One plough, one cart or truck wagon or one express
wagon, one harrow, one yoke with bows, ring and staple, 2 chains, one ox sled and
one mowing machine, one corn planter, one potato planter, one cultivator, one
horse hoe, one horse rake, one sprayer or duster, one grain harvester and one potato
digger;
10. Boat. One boat not exceeding 5 tons burden, usually employed in fishing
business, belonging wholly to an inhabitant of the State.
The exception provided for agricultural crop loans is not directly related to the subject under
discussion and will not be expressly treated.
137 See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4101, supra nate 136. The vulnerability of exempt
property to attachment and execution in actions for its purchase price is discussed in note 33
sup ra.
138 Exempt property is generally not considered by creditors in evaluating creditworthi-
ness. Jurisdictions that permit creditors to take nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security
interests in exempt property allow it to become a factor by agreement of the parties. See
COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA 257 (1974):
These [exemption statutes] did not impair the obligation of contracts because, by
implication, all loans were conditioned on the exclusion of specified types and
amounts of property from execution. The lender gave up in advance some of his
attachment rights.
139 See, e.g., State v. AVCO Fin. Servs., 50 N.Y.2d 383, 388, 406 N.E.2d 1075, 1077, 429
N.Y.S.2d 181, 183-84 (1980); Montford v. Grohman, 36 N.C. App. 733, 737, 245 S.E.2d 219,
223 (1978).
140 See, e.g., Mutual Loan & Thrift Corp. v. Corn, 182 Tenn. 554, 557, 188 S.W.2d 345,
346 (1945).
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debtors of the full value of their assets. 14 1 If, however, one accepts
the legislature's judgment that the property protected by the statute
represents the "necessities of life,"' 142 the prohibition against creating
enforceable security interests in these necessities is consistent with the
policy underlying exemption legislation. The Maine legislature has
declared that such property is not only beyond the reach of un-
secured creditors, but that the debtor may not agree to sacrifice his
exemption in such property. 143
The practical impact of the statute restricts the debtor's ability
to obtain credit, but the severity of this restriction is de minimls.144
The statute furthers the policy underlying exemption law in the same
manner as prohibitions on exemption waivers. 145 The Maine exemp-
tion statute simply eliminates the formalistic distinction the courts
have recognized between security interests in exempt personalty and
exemption waivers. 146
A Pennsylvania statute provides that debtors may not waive ex-
emption rights by "express or implied contract."' 147 The statute pro-
hibits prospective waivers, implied waivers and waivers given at the
time of levy pursuant to execution. 148 The proscription appears to be
141 But see Barbarossa v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 438 F. Supp. 840, 842 (E.D. Va. 1977).
142 G. PENDLETON, DEBTORS' EXEMPTIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA 18 (1886). See Mayhugh
v. Coon, 460 Pa. 128, 134, 331 A.2d 452, 455 (1975).
143 If a debtor owns property within the exempt categories valued in excess of the exemp-
tion, the property may be subject to forced sale. The proceeds will be distributed: first, to the
debtor in the amount of the exemption; second, to the creditor in the amount of his claim;
and third, any surplus to the debtor. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4402 (1980).
144 Cf. Mayhugh v. Coon, 460 Pa. 128, 137, 331 A.2d 452, 456 (1975) (holding prospective
waivers unenforceable and rejecting the argument that this result would damage the credit
industry). See also Vukowich, supra note 10, at 852; NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER
FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES 26-27 (1973).
145 See Section III supra.
146 For a discussion of the operation of the Maine statute in the context of bankruptcy
proceedings, see Hertz, Bankruptc
, 
Code Exemptions: Notes on the E4fect of State Law, 54 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 339 (1980).
147 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8122 (Purdon Pamph. 1981), provides as follows:
Exemptions from attachment and execution granted by statute may not be
waived by the debtor by express or implied contract before or after the commence-
ment of the matter, the entry of judgment or otherwise.
Exemptions granted by statute in Pennsylvania include an exemption of $300 in bank
notes, money, securities, real property, judgments or other indebtedness owed to the debtor,
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8123 (Purdon Pamph. 1981); and specific property exemp-
tions in wearing apparel, Bibles and school books, sewing machines, uniforms, certain pension
benefits, and certain insurance proceeds, PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8124 (Purdon
Pamph. 1981); property on display at international exhibitions, PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42,
§ 8125 (Purdon Pamph. 1981); and wages, salaries and commissions in the hands of an em-
ployer, PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8127 (Purdon Pamph. 1981).
148 The conclusion that waivers given at the time of levy are ineffective is drawn from the
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absolute.' 49 Mortgages of exempt chattels and nonpossessory, non-
purchase-money security interests are subordinate to exemption
rights.1 50 Although the statute is silent on this point, it is reasonable
to assume that possessory, nonpurchase-money security interests, as
well as purchase money security interests, will continue to take prece-
dence over exemption rights. 151
Minnesota is another jurisdiction in which exemption rights
may not be overcome by consensual liens. 52 Apart from purchase-
statutory language indicating that a waiver may not be given "after judgment or otherwise."
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8122 (Purdon Pamph. 1981).
149 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8122 (Purdon Pamph. 1981), supra note 147.
150 The statute expressly prohibits implied waivers. Id.
151 Id. Se note 153 infra.
152 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.37 (West Cum. Supp. 1981) establishes categories and
amounts of exempt personal property and sets forth limitations on the creation of nonposses-
sory, nonpurchase-money security interests. The same statutory section permits prospective
exemption waivers under certain circumstances, but only as to specified categories of exempt
property. The statute provides:
Property exempt:
Subdivision 1. The property mentioned in this section is not liable to attach-
ment, garnishment, or sale of any final process, issued from any court.
Subd. 2. The family bible, library, and musical instruments.
Subd. 3. A seat or pew in any house or place of public worship and a lot in any
burial ground.
Subd. 4. All wearing apparel, one watch, household furniture, utensils, house-
hold appliances, phonographs, radio and television receivers, and foodstuffs on the
debtor and his family, not exceeding $3,000 in value. The exemption provided by
this subdivision may not be waived with regard to purchase money security inter-
ests. Except for a pawnbroker's possessory lien, a nonpurchase-money security in-
terest in the property exempt under this subdivision is void.
Provided however, if a debtor has property of the type which would qualify for
the exemption under this subdivision, of a value in excess of $3,000, an itemized list
of the exempt property, together with the value of each item listed, shall be at-
tached to the security agreement at the time a security interest is taken, and a
creditor may take a nonpurchase-money security interest in the excess over $3,000
by requiring the debtor to select his exemption in writing at the time the loan is
made.
Subd. 5. Farm machines and implements used in farming operations by a
debtor engaged principally in farming, livestock, farm produce, and standing crops,
not exceeding $5,000 in value.
Subd. 6. The tools, implements, machines, instruments, onfice furniture, stock
in trade, and library reasonably necessary in the trade, business, or profession of the
debtor, not exceeding $5,000 in value.
Subd. 7. The total value of property selected by a debtor pursuant to subdivi-
sions 5 and 6 shall not exceed $5,000.
Subd. 8. The library and philosophical and chemical or other apparatus [sic]
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money security interests and pawnbrokers' possessory liens,153 the
belonging to, and used for the instruction of youth in, any university, college, semi-
nary of learning, or school which is indiscriminately open to the public.
Subd. 9. All money arising from any claim on account of the destruction of, or
damage to, exempt property.
Subd. 10. All money received by, or payable to, a surviving wife or child from
insurance upon the life of a deceased husband or father, not exceeding $10,000.
Subd. 11. All money, relief, or other benefits payable or to be rendered by any
police department association, fire department association, beneficiary association,
or fraternal benefit association to any person entitled to assistance therefrom, or to
any certificate holder thereof or beneficiary under any such certificate.
Subd. 12. A mobile home, as defined in section 168.011, subdivision 8, which
is actually inhabited as a home by the debtor.
Subd. 12a. One motor vehicle to the extent of a value not exceeding $2,000.
Subd. 13. [Wage garnishment limitation.]
Subd. 14. [Welfare and similar relief payments; wages of welfare recipients.]
Subd. 15. The earnings of the minor child of any debtor or the proceeds
thereof, by reason of any liability of such debtor not contracted for the special bene-
fit of such minor child.
Subd. 16. The claim for damages recoverable by any person by reason of a
levy upon sale under execution of his exempt personal property, or by reason of the
wrongful taking or detention of such property by any person, and any judgment
recovered for such damages.
Subd. 17. All articles exempted by this section shall be selected by the debtor,
his agent, or legal representative.
Subd. 18. The exemptions provided for in subdivisions 3 to 15 extend only to
debtors who are natural persons.
Subd. 19. The exemption of the property listed in subdivisions 2, 3, 5 to 11,
and 12a may not be waived except by a statement in substantially the following
form, in bold face type of a minimum size of 12 points, signed and dated by the
debtor at the time of the execution of the contract surrendering the exemption,
immediately adjacent to the listing of the property: "I understand that some or all
of the above property is normally protected by law from the claims of creditors, and
I voluntarily give up my right to that protection for the above listed property with
respect to claims arising out of this contract."
Subd. 20. [Application of exemptions to funds in bank accounts].
Subd. 21. For the purpose of this section "value" means current fair market
value.
Subd. 22. Rights of action for injuries to the person of the debtor or of a
relative whether or not resulting in death.
Subd. 23. The debtor's aggregate interest not to exceed in value $4,000 in any
accrued dividend or interest under or loan value of any unmatured life insurance
contract owned by the debtor under which the insured is the debtor or an individ-
ual of whom the debtor is a dependent.
Subd. 24. The debtor's right to receive a payment under a stock bonus, pen-
sion, profit sharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract on account of illness, disa-
bility, death, age, or length of service, to the extent reasonably necessary for the
support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor.
153 The pledge of property entails parting with possession, and therefore loss of use at the
time the lien is created. Thus, pledges present less of a threat to exemption policies than do
nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money liens. Pledges and possessory liens represent transactions
in which debtors are aware of the consequences of their actions from the outset. See notes 80
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Minnesota statute does not permit the enforcement of consensual
liens in household property with an aggregate value1 54 of $3,000 or
less.' 55 If a Minnesota debtor wishes to grant a nonpossessory, non-
purchase-money security interest in household property with value in
excess of $3,000 a property schedule of the debtor must be appended
to the security agreement. 56 In the property schedule the debtor
designates property worth $3,000 in which the exemption is claimed.
The creditor is free to take a security interest in the excess.' 57
The Minnesota statute, like the Maine statute, 58 removes from
the reach of creditors a limited amount of exempt property. 159 Al-
though the statutes differ in detail, 60 they both reflect a legislative
judgment that effective implementation of exemption policy requires
that exemptions be given preference over traditional notions of free-
dom of contract and property rights.' 6'
In addition to its substantive limitations on creditors' rights, the
& 90 supra and accompanying text. In addition, most states extensively regulate the activities
of pawnbrokers. A discussion of possessory liens in exempt property is therefore beyond the
scope of this article.
154 "Value" means the current fair market value. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.37(21) (West
Cum. Supp. 1981), supra note 152. "Current" fair market value apparently means value on
the date that the security interest was created. See id. at § 550.37(4).
155 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.37(4) (West Cum. Supp. 1981), supra note 152.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 See notes 135-144 supra and accompanying text.
159 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.37(4) (West Cum. Supp. 1981), supra note 152.
160 The Maine statute exempts from execution ten separate categories of goods. The stat-
ute also prohibits nonpurchase-money security interests in such goods. See ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 4401 (1980), supra note 136. As to each category a certain dollar value, e.g.,
$1,000 worth of wearing apparel, or amount, e.g., one fishing boat, is protected. Id. Under
the Minnesota provision, twenty-one categories of property are exempted either up to a cer-
tain quantity, e.g., one seat or pew in a church or meeting house, or value, e.g., farm imple-
ments and tools of trade up to $5,000. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.37 (West Cum. Supp. 1981),
supra note 152. Minnesota, unlike Maine, permits consensual possessory liens in items in
which nonpurchase-money security interests otherwise may not be taken. Id.
The Maine statute prohibits nonpurchase-money security interests in all categories of
exempt property up to the amount or value of the exemption. The Minnesota statute voids
nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interests in only one category of exempt goods.
See text accompanying note 152 sura. Maine's statute protects only $1,000 worth of wearing
apparel and household goods and furnishings but extends like protection to the other exemp-
tion categories. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4401 (1980), supra note 136. Minnesota
shields from execution and consensual lien $3,000 worth of wearing apparel and household
goods and furnishings, but permits nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money consensual liens in
other exempt property. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.37 (West Cum. Supp. 1981), supra note 152.
The differences in the statutes are attributable to divergent legislative judgments as to
the importance of the categories of exempt property to the debtor and his family and the
degree of protection necessary for each category.
161 Minnesota's statutory restrictions on the creation of consensual liens in exempt assets
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Minnesota statute contains several beneficial procedural safeguards
not found in the Maine statute. Nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money
security interests in otherwise exempt personalty of a value in excess
of $3,000 are permitted, 162 provided the debtor's property schedule
designates the items which will remain exempt.1 63 This procedure
reminds the debtor at the time of the transaction that he has exemp-
tion rights. 6 4 It requires the debtor to consider the value of each
item of exempt property and to select those items that will remain
outside the security interest. The debtor makes a conscious choice to
bargain away his exemption rights in exchange for an extension of
credit.165 The Maine statute lacks this attribute, and permits the
"forced sale"' 66 of exempt personalty valued above the exemption
limits. 67 Finally, under the Minnesota statute, in the event of de-
fault the debtor's property schedule provides an efficient means of
determining which items are available to satisfy the creditor's
claims. 168
5. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code 169
Both the 1968 and 1974 versions of the Uniform Consumer
are open to the same criticisms as the restrictions contained in the Maine statute, supra note
139-46 and accompanying text.
162 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.37(4) (West Cum. Supp. 1981), supra note 152.
163 Id.
164 In states like Minnesota, where exemptions may not be impliedly waived by security
agreement, disclosure of exemption rights is less critical than in states which permit either
security agreements in exempt property or prospective exemption waivers. Cf. MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 550.37(19) (West Cum. Supp. 1981), supra note 152.
165 One historical justification for permitting implied exemption waivers through chattel
mortgages and security agreements was that the debtor could more fully appreciate the impli-
cations of his actions. But see note 80 supra and accompanying text and discussion injfa at
Section IV.D. 1.
166 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4401 (1980), supra note 136.
167 See id. The wording of the statute is unclear, but it appears that a security interest
created in exempt property would attach only to the value in excess of the amount of the
exemption. Upon default the creditor could take possession and sell the property, provided
the debtor receives proceeds in the amount of the exemption "off the top." Id. Se note 143
supra. This conclusion is drawn from the statute's use of the term "forced sale" in § 4402
rather than the narrower terms "attachment and execution" found in § 4401. Forced sale
would seem to include a creditor's sale under U.C.C. § 9-504. In this regard, Maine debtors
would benefit from a procedure, such as Minnesota's, notwithstanding the protection already
afforded them.
168 In regard to household goods and furnishings and wearing apparel the schedule would
establish what items constituted after-acquired property. Such property cannot be made the
subject of a security interest if no later advances are made under the security agreement. See
U.C.C. § 9-204(2) and notes 128-35 s.upra and accompanying text.
169 7 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 223 (1978). The Uniform Consumer Credit Code [hereinafter
cited as U.C.C.C.] was approved in Final Draft by the National Conference of Commissioners
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Credit Code (U.C.C.C.) restrict the use of debtor's property as collat-
eral. Indebtedness arising out of "consumer credit sales" and "con-
sumer leases"' 70 may be secured by a debtor's property only if a
on Uniform State Laws on July 30, 1968, and by the American Bar Association on August 7,
1968. Id. at 240. The U.C.C.C. was revised and the revision approved by the National
Conference in 1974. Id. at 583. [The 1974 revision of the U.C.C.C. will hereinafter be cited
as U.C.C.C. (1974)]. The U.C.C.C. was drafted to provide uniform statutory provisions
furthering the following policies:
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing retail installment
sales, consumer credit, small loans and usury;
(b) to provide rate ceilings to assure an adequate supply of credit to
consumers;
(c) to further consumer understanding of the terms of credit transactions and
to foster competition among suppliers of consumer credit so that consumers may
obtain credit at a reasonable cost;
(d) to protect consumer buyers, lessees, and borrowers against unfair
practices by some suppliers of consumer credit, having due regard for the interests
of legitimate and scrupulous creditors;
(e) to permit and-encourage the development of fair and economically sound
consumer credit practices;
(i) to conform the regulation of consumer credit transactions to the policies of
the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act; and
(g) to make uniform the law, including administrative rules, among the
various jurisdictions.
U.C.C.C. § 1.102(2). For information regarding the impact and operation of the U.C.C.C.,
see Robertson, Comparison of the Code with the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 41 Miss. L.J.
36 (1969); Miller & Warren, The 1974 Unfomz Consumer Credit Code, 23 KAN. L. REV. 619
(1975).
170 U.C.C.C. § 2.104 defines "consumer credit sale" as follows:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), "consumer credit sale" is a sale of
goods, services, or an interest in land in which
(a) credit is granted by a person who regularly engages as a seller in credit
transactions of the same kind,
(b) the buyer is a person other than an organization,
(c) the goods, services, or interest in land are purchased primarily for a per-
sonal, family, household, or agricultural purpose,
(d) either the debt is payable in installments or a credit service charge is
made, and
(e) with respect to a sale of goods or services, the amount financed does not
exceed $25,000.
(2) Unless the sale is made subject to this Act by agreement (Section 2.601),
"consumer credit sale" does not include
(a) a sale in which the seller allows the buyer to purchase goods or services
pursuant to a lender credit card or similar arrangement, or
(b) except as provided with respect to disclosure (Section 2.301) and debtors'
remedies (Section 5.201), a sale of an interest in land if the credit service charge
does not exceed 10 percent per year calculated according to the actuarial method
on the unpaid balances of the amount financed on the assumption that the debt
will be paid according to the agreed terms and will not be paid before the end of
the agreed term.
(3) The amount of $25,000 in subsection (1) is subject to change pursuant to
the provisions on adjustment of dollar amounts (Section 1.106).
[Vol. 57-215]
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
purchase-money security interest is created or if the property
purchased becomes "closely connected" with the debtor's other prop-
erty and the debt secured is "substantial."' I 7' A lessor in a consumer
lease transaction may not take a security interest in the debtor's
property unless the lease is primarily agricultural.17 2 Security inter-
ests taken in contravention of U.C.C.C. provisions are void.
173
The U.C.C.C. permits consumer sellers and lessors to use "cross-
collateral" in securing indebtedness.1 74  This provision permits a
seller engaging in multiple sales to a single buyer to secure the in-
debtedness arising from a later sale with existing security interests in
Cf. U.C.C.C. (1974) § 1.301(12) (substantially similar definition). U.C.C.C. § 2.106 defines a
consumer lease as follows:
(1) "Consumer lease" means a lease of goods
(a) which a lessor regularly engaged in the business of leasing
makes to a person, other than an organization, who takes under the lease
primarily for a personal, family, household, or agricultural purpose,
(b) in which the amount payable under the lease does not exceed
$25,000, and
(c) which is for a term exceeding four months.
(2) "Consumer lease" does not include a lease made pursuant to a lender
credit card or similar arrangement.
(3) The amount of $25,000 in subsection (1) is subject to change pursuant to
the provisions on adjustment of dollar amounts (Section 1.106).
Cf U.C.C.C. (1974) § 1.301(14).
171 Official Comment to U.C.C.C. § 2.407, 7 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 367 (1978). A "sub-
stantial" debt is defined as $300 in regard to a security interest in closely connected goods,
and $1,000 in the case of closely connected realty. Id. U.C.C.C. § 2.407 provides as follows:
(1) With respect to a consumer credit sale, a seller may take a security inter-
est in the property sold. In addition, a seller may take a security interest in goods
upon which services are performed or in which goods sold are installed or to which
they are annexed, or in land to which the goods are affixed or which is maintained,
repaired or improved as a result of the sale of the goods or services, if in the case of a
security interest in land the debt secured is $1,000 or more, or, in the case of a
security interest in goods, the debt secured is $300 or more. The seller may also
take a security interest in any property of the buyer to secure the debt arising from
a consumer credit sale primarily for an agricultural purpose. Except as provided
with respect to cross-collateral (Section 2.408), a seller may not otherwise take. a
security interest in property of the buyer to secure the debt arising from a consumer
credit sale.
(2) With respect to a consumer lease other than a lease primarily for an agri-
cultural purpose, a lessor may not take a security interest in property of the lessee to
secure the debt arising from the lease.
(3) A security interest taken in violation of this section is void.
(4) The amounts of $1,000 and $300 in subsection (1) are subject to change
pursuant to the provisions on adjustment of dollar amounts (Section 1.106).
Cf. U.C.C.C. (1974) § 3.301 (substantially similar provision expressly permitting the lessor to
take a lease deposit).
172 U.C.C.C. § 2.407(2), id; U.C.C.C. (1974) § 3.301(2).
173 ,See note 171 supra.
174 See U.C.C.C. §§ 2.407(1), 2.408; U.C.C.C. (1974) §§ 3.301(1), 3.302.
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property previously sold. 75 Property sold later may also be used as
security for previous debts. 176
In addition to the U.C.C.C. restrictions upon sellers' and lessors'
use of security interests in consumers' property, the 1974 version re-
stricts lenders' enforcement of nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money se-
curity interests in exempt property. 17" Lenders making secured
"supervised loans" may not, without prior notice and hearing or con-
sent of the debtor, enforce security interests in exempt property. 17 If
the debtor refuses to surrender possession of exempt collateral and a
court finds that retention of the property is necessary to avoid undue
hardship on the debtor or his family, the lender will be unable to
enforce the security interest in the property. 79
The 1974 version of the U.C.C.C. provides comprehensive pro-
175 U.C.C.C. § 2.408; U.C.C.C. (1974) § 3.303.
176 U.C.C.C. § 2.409 and U.C.C.C. (1974) § 3.303 establish methods for crediting pay-
ments and releasing security interests in the multiple-debt, cross-collateral context. Some
states that have not adopted the U.C.C.C. have enacted similar provisions regulating cross-
collateral financing. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 516.31(4) (West 1972 & Supp. 1980).
177 U.C.C.C. (1974) § 5.116, infa note 178.
178 See U.C.C.C. (1974) § 5.116, which provides as follows:
(1) Except as to a purchase money security interest, this section applies to a
security interest in an item of goods other than a motor vehicle which (1) is pos-
sessed by a consumer, (b) is being used by him or a member of a family wholly or
partly supported by him, (c) is or may be claimed to be exempt from execution on
a money judgment under the laws of this State, and (d) is collateral for a super-
vised loan.
(2) Unless the consumer, after written notice to him of his rights under this
section, voluntarily surrenders to the lender possession of any item of goods to
which this section applies, the lender, without an order or process of the [ - ]
court, may not take possession of the item or otherwise enforce the security interest
according to its terms. The notice to the consumer shall conform to any rule
adopted by the Administrator.
(3) The court may order or authorize process respecting an item of goods to
which this section applies only after a hearing upon notice to the consumer of the
hearing and his rights at it. The notice shall be as directed by the court. The order
or authorization may prescribe appropriate conditions as to payments upon the
debt secured or otherwise. The court may not order or authorize process respecting
the item if it finds upon the hearing both that the consumer lacks the means to pay
all or part of the debt secured and that continued possession and use of the item is
necessary to avoid undue hardship for the consumer or a member of a family whol-
ly or partly supported by him.
(4) The court, upon application of the lender or the consumer and notice to
the other, and after a hearing and a finding of changed circumstances, may vacate
or modify an order or authorization pursuant to this section.
A "supervised loan" is an installment loan of $25,000 or less at an interest rate of more than
18 per cent, made to an individual for personal, family, household, or agricultrual purposes.
U.C.C.C. (1974) § 1.301.
179 U.C.C.C. (1974) § 5.116.
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tection for debtors against the creation of security interests in exempt
property in connection with consumer leases, sales and loans. 180 The
1968 U.C.C.C. provides similar protection against the creation of se-
curity interests,' 81 but does not restrict the collateral available to se-
cure consumer loans.'8 2 The U.C.C.C. provisions appear to be in
harmony with the public policy underpinning exemption statutes. 183
It can be argued, however, that the 1974 U.C.C.C. provisions
are overly protective of debtors' exemption rights. The U.C.C.C.
places procedural and substantive restrictions on enforcement of se-
curity interests in all property exempt under state law other than
motor vehicles. 184 In contrast, the 1974 report of the National Com-
mission on Consumer Finance recommended that the prohibition of
nonpurchase-money security interests be limited to "household
goods."' 8 5 The 1974 U.C.C.C. requires that notice and a hearing be
provided prior to the enforcement of a security interest. In contrast,
under the U.C.C. the creditor may repossess his collateral unencum-
bered by costly procedural safeguards. 18 6 The stringent approach of
the 1974 U.C.C.C. is justified if one assumes that only the basic "ne-
cessities of life"' 187 are protected by state exemption statutes. In some
states, however, exemption laws protect assets which may properly be
the basis for extensions of credit without creating potential hardship
for debtors. 8 In this situation, the safeguards of the 1974 U.C.C.C.
impose unnecessary burdens on creditors.
Due in part to its pro-debtor orientation, the U.C.C.C. has not
been warmly received in state legislatures. Eight states have enacted
180 U.C.C.C. (1974) § 3.301.
181 U.C.C.C. § 2.407.
182 Seegenerally U.C.C.C. art. 3, part. 4.
183 See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE
UNITED STATES (1974). The Commission recommended that creditors not be permitted to
take nonpurchase-money security interests in household goods. It further recommended that
in consumer sales creditors not be permitted to take security interests in debtors' property,
other than the property which is the subject of the sale. Id. at 27. These recommendations
were based in part on the Commission's findings that there exists no significant need for the
use of such collateral in the credit industry. Id.
184 U.C.C.C. (1974) § 5.116, sufira note 178.
185 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE
UNITED STATES, supra note 183, at 27.
186 See Karp Bros., Inc. v. West Ward Say. & Loan Ass'n, 440 Pa. 583, 271 A.2d 493
(1970).
187 Official Comment to U.C.C.C. (1974) § 5.116, 7 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 776 (1978).
188 Cf. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.37 (West Cum. Supp. 1981) (treating different categories




the 1968 version of the U.C.C.C.89 Only three states have passed the
1974 U.C.C.C.' 9° The U.C.C.C. provisions that touch upon the
problem of security interests in exempt personalty are part of a com-
prehensive scheme of consumer credit regulation that is worthy of
examination. Absent renewed legislative enthusiasm for the Code as
a whole, however, the pertinent provisions of the U.C.C.C. are un-
likely to be enacted.
6. Conclusion
The state statutes that regulate consensual liens generally fail to
resolve the conflict between the need to safeguard exemption rights
in basic necessities and the need to facilitate the creation and en-
forcement of security interests in other chattels. In general, the pro-
tection afforded exempt property against creditors' security interests
is either too broad, as under the Maine statute and the 1974
U.C.C.C., or incomplete, as under the New Hampshire Small Loan
Act and Article 9 of the U.C.C. Only the Minnesota statute recog-
nizes that within the general category of exempt personalty there ex-
ists a subcategory of property of substantial importance to the well-
being of debtors but of comparatively little economic worth as collat-
eral to secure indebtedness.
D. Nonpossessory, Nonpurchase-Money Security Interests
in Exempt Personalty
1. An Evaluation
In most jurisdictions the law concerning exemption waivers is
both contradictory and inadequate to achieve the purposes of exemp-
tion legislation. Most courts agree that prospective exemption waiv-
ers violate either statutory restrictions or public policy. 9 The same
courts that condemn exemption waivers however, permit creation of
security interests in exempt chattels without restriction. 9 2 The law
readily permits debtors to bargain away their exemption rights
189 COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 5-1-101 to 5-9-103 (1973 & Supp. 1980); IDAHO CODE §§ 28-31-
101 to 28-39-103 (1979); IND. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §§ 24-4.5-1-101 to 24-4.5-6-203 (Bums 1974
& Supp. 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, §§ 1-101 to 9-103 (West 1980); S.C. CODE §§ 37-
1-101 to 37-6-416 (1976 & Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 70B-1-101 to 70B-1 1-105 (1980
& Supp. 1981); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 421.101427.105 (West 1974 & Supp. 1981); Wyo. STAT.
§§ 40-14-101 to 40-14-702 (1977).
190 IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 537.1101-537.7103 (West Supp. 1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 16a-
1-101 -16a-9-102 (1974); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, §§ 1-101 to 6-415 (1980).
191 See Section III supra.
192 See Section IV B supra.
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through chattel mortgages 93 or security agreements. 94 Moreover,
enforcement of creditor rights against exempt property is generally
authorized by state statute. 95
It is argued that to inhibit debtors' ability to use exempt chattels
as collateral would be to deny debtors the right to dispose of their
property. 196 Although it is accurate to portray exemption policy as
inconsistent with traditional principles of property and contract law,
that is an insufficient reason to enforce security interests in all exempt
chattels. Exemption statutes, as applied by the courts, have long en-
tailed significant restrictions on debtors' rights to "dispose" of their
property. 197 For example, judicial and statutory invalidation of pro-
spective exemption waivers amounts to a restriction on the debtor's
power to barter property and exemption rights for credit. Joint exe-
cution requirements represent an outright denial of the debtor's right
unilaterally to alienate his exempt property. 198 Provisions of small
loan acts,' 99 the U.C.C.2° ° and the U.C.C.C.,201 similarly restrict a
debtor's ability to enhance his creditworthiness by consensually
transferring interests in his property.
States that have enacted statutes prohibiting the enforcement of
security interests in exempt chattels have recognized that exemption
policy is not compatible with traditional notions governing the alien-
ation of property. For the most part, however, traditional contract
and property rights have attained ascendancy over the aims of ex-
emption policy. Nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security inter-
ests in even the most basic exempt necessity have routinely been
enforced. 20 2
2. Legislative Solutions-A Modest Proposal
Personal property exemption statutes are intended to insulate
debtors from abject poverty. The essence of exemption policy re-
193 E.g., City Loan & Savings Co. v. Keenan, 136 Ohio St. 125, 24 N.E.2d 452 (1939);
Congress Candy Co. v. Farmer, 73 N.D. 174, 12 N.W.2d 796 (1944).
194 E.g., Hemandez v. S.I.C. Fin. Co., 79 N.M. 673, 448 P.2d 474 (1968); State v. AVCO
Fin. Servs., 50 N.Y.2d 383, 406 N.E.2d 1075, 429 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1980); Montford v.
Grohman, 36 N.C. App. 733, 245 S.E.2d 219 (1978).
195 See note 36 supra.
196 See text accompanying notes 101-03 sura.
197 See text accompanying notes 137-46 supra.
198 See text accompanying notes 115-17 supra.
199 See text accompanying notes 120-21 supra.
200 See text accompanying notes 127-29 supra.
201 See text accompanying notes 169-190 supra.
202 See Section IV supra.
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quires that the state legislature identify and protect property neces-
sary to the continued well-being of embarrassed debtors. This type
of property will be termed "basic exempt necessities. '20 3 A statute
should provide the standard exemptions from executions coupled
with provisions denying debtors the ability to create nonpossessory,
nonpurchase-money security interests in basic exempt necessities. 204
The property classified as basic exempt necessities should in-
clude: (1) the wearing apparel of the debtor and his dependents; 20 5
(2) household goods, furnishings and appliances that are necessary to
provide for the daily needs of the debtor and his family;20 6 (3) tools of
the debtor's trade, farm implements and necessary professional li-
braries;20 7 (4) professionally prescribed medical aids necessary to the
203 Set forth below is the author's recommended minimum content for the category "basic
exempt necessities." Because exemption provisions reflect the particular policies a state
wishes to promote, see Section II at notes 16-22 sufpra, there is good reason to expect variation
among the states. Cf. Kennedy, Limitation of Exemptions in Bankruipty, 485 IowA L. REv. 445,
485-86 (1959). Other commentators have suggested that certain exempt chattels be protected
against the claims of creditors by restricting the creditor's ability to create security interests in
such property. See, e.g., Vukowich, supra note 10, at 873-75; UNIFORM ExEMPTIONS AcT
§§ 10- 11. See also NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN
THE UNITED STATES 27 (1974).
204 Invalidation of nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interests in certain catego-
ries of exempt property would protect possession and use of such property thereby providing a
phyical barrier against abject poverty. Current law provides only a temporary economic bar-
rier against destitution.
205 Protecting wearing apparel is consistent with the earliest concerns of exemption policy.
See note 10 sup'a. Provisions extending basic exempt necessity protection to wearing apparel
must be drafted to include only apparel that is actually in use by the debtor and his depen-
dents and to excludejewelry. Given proper definitional restrictions, a limitation on the dollar
value of exempt apparel would not be required.
206 Protection should extend only to items actually necessary for personal, family or
household purposes. "Household goods, furnishings, and appliances within the category of
basic exempt necessities" should be defined to include one cooking stove, one refrigerator or
refrigerator-freezer, one television, one radio, one washing machine, one clothes dryer, beds
and bedding for the debtor and each dependent, a table, and a chair for the debtor and each
dependent. If the statute requires that items claimed exempt within this category be neces-
sary and actually used for personal, family or household purposes a value limitation upon this
exemption category would be unnecessary.
A provision enumerating items within this proposed exemption should indicate that the
list is not exclusive. A debtor, upon demonstrating actual need, should be able to bring addi-
tional items of household goods, furnishings and appliances within the protection of the basic
exempt necessity category. Cf. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1123 (1980 Supp.) (comprehen-
sive list of exempt household furniture, furnishings and appliances).
207 Tools of trade or similar items should be beyond the reach of nonpossessory, nonpur-
chase-money security interests. The debtor thus retains a means of generating income with
which to rehabilitate himself. A value limitation of at least $2,000 is advisable on this exemp-
tion category. The debtor's interest in tools of trade, professional libraries and farm equip-
ment may often be of sufficient value in excess of the non-waivable portion of the exemption
to be used as collateral for an extension of credit. Moreover, creditores seizure and sale of such
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health of the debtor or his dependents; 20 8 and (5) family religious
volumes, portraits, books and heirlooms of personal, sentimental, or
historical value.20 9
To insure the proper protection of basic exempt necessities the
exemption provisions currently covering such property 210 should in-
clude language similar to the following: "The exemption provided
by this subsection may not be waived expressly or impliedly by crea-
tion of nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interests in the
property subject to this exemption."
The statute may set a maximum value of property that may be
claimed as exempt within a given category.21' Basic exempt neces-
sity protection may be extended up to a stated value by requiring the
debtor, at the time a security interest is created, to provide a schedule
of all property potentially claimable as exempt and to designate
which items will remain unencumbered as basic exempt
necessities.2 12
Protecting basic exempt necessities against nonpossessory, non-
purchase-money security interest should not be condemned as unjus-
items is less likely to subject a debtor and his family to immediate deprivation of basic com-
forts than would a creditor's seizure and sale of items such as wearing apparel and household
goods.
208 Cf. UNIFORM EXEMPTIONs ACr § 11(1) (1980).
209 This category has traditionally been limited to family Bibles. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN.
§ 51-1301(12) (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 52, 13 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980). This limita-
tion is not justified in a religiously diverse society. This category should provide sufficient
flexibility so that volumes of an important personal or family library, musical instruments,
and family portraits and heirlooms may, upon a showing by the debtor, be protected as basic
exempt necessities. Of course, such items may be protected by standard exemption treatment
in the absence of a showing of substantial personal, family or historical value.
210 E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.35.080 (Cum. Supp. 1980); ARIZ. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-1123, 35-
1125 (Supp. 1980); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 690.1 (West 1973); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 651-
121 (1976 & Supp. 1980).
211 E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.37 (West Gum. Supp. 1981); NEv. REV. STAT. § 21.090
(1979).
212 The Minnesota provision is a useful model:
Provided, however, if a debtor has property of the type which would qualify
for the exemption provided by this subdivision, of a value in excess of $3,000, an
itemized list of the exempt property, together with the value of each item listed,
shall be attached to the security agreement at the time a security interest is taken,
and a creditor may take a nonpurchase-money security interest in the excess over
$3,000 by requiring the debtor to select his exemption in writing at the time the
loan is made.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.37(4) (West Cum. Supp. 1980). The Minnesota exemption statute




tifiably "paternalistic. ' 2 3 Exemption statutes have always been
essentially paternalistic in that their purpose is to protect debtors
against their own improvidence.214 The issue is the degree and cer-
tainty of protection to be afforded.
Once basic exempt necessities have been identified, defined and
protected, legislatures could enact or retain additional exemptions as
they saw fit. Creditors and debtors should be free to bargain for se-
curity interests in chattels falling within the additional exemptions.
Some jurisdictions permit debtors to select any personal prop-
erty as exempt, up to a given dollar value.215 Although there is merit
to this "flexible" approach, 216 the creation of specific categories of
basic exempt necessities is more consistent with exemption policy.
Using specific categories, items of basic exempt necessity can be iden-
tified by the debtor and withheld from any transaction creating a
nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in personal
property.2 7
213 Cf. State v. AVCO Fin. Servs., 50 N.Y.2d 383, 406 N.E.2d 1075, 429 N.Y.S.2d 181
(1980); Montford v. Grohman, 36 N.C. App. 733, 245 S.E.2d 219 (1978).
214 See, e.g., Kneettle v. Newcomb, 22 N.Y. 249 (1860). The paternalistic character of
exemption policy was articulated by the Florida Supreme Court in Carter's Adm'rs v. Carter,
20 Fla. 558 (1884):
The object of exemption laws is to protect people of limited means and their fami-
lies in the enjoyment of so much property as may be necessary to prevent absolute
pauperism and want, and against the consequence of ill advised promises which
their lack of judgment and discretion may have led them to make, or which they
may have been induced to enter into by persuasion of others.
In this country especially where there happen to be many illiterate and unso-
phisticated people it would be mischievous to encourage such agreement in which
by the mere scratch of a pen the whole policy of exemption laws would become
nugatory. Such people, without reference to "race, color or previous condition,"
are and ought everywhere to be the wards of the state and to be protected
accordingly.
Id. at 569-70.
215 E.g., ARK. CONST. art. 9, § 1; GA. CODE ANN. § 51-101 (Supp. 1981); W. VA. CODE
§ 38-8-1 (Supp. 1980).
216 See Joslin, Debtorr Exemption Laws: Time for Modernization, 34 IND. L.J. 355, 356-59
(1959).
217 For example, West Virginia's "open designation" personal property exemption provi-
sion, W. VA. CODE § 38-8-1 (Supp. 1980), set forth below, could be so amended by adding the
italicized language:
Any husband, wife, parent or other head of a household residing in this State,
or the infant children of deceased parents, may set apart and hold personal prop-
erty not exceeding one thousand dollars in value to be exempt from execution or
other process, except as hereinafter provided. Any mechanic, artisan or laborer
residing in this State, whether he be a husband, wife, parent or other head of a
household, or not, may hold the working tools of his trade or occupation to the
value of fifty dollars exempt from forced sale or execution: Provided, that in no
case shall the exemption allowed any one person exceed one thousand dollars. The
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An other means of furthering exemption policy would be to en-
act a statute prohibiting the enforcement of security interests in ex-
empt personalty created by dragnet collateral clauses. This could be
achieved by requiring that security interests be enforced only as to
items specifically identified in the security agreement.2 18 Alterna-
tively, a statute could provide that a loan or security agreement pur-
porting to create a security interest in all personal property will not
create a security interest in the debtor's exempt property.219
3. Judicial Solutions: Public Policy and Unconscionability
The courts, in the absence of legislative direction, 220 are unlikely
to invalidate consensual liens in basic exempt necessities.2 21 Credi-
tors' use of dragnet collateral clauses,2 22 however, can and should be
exemption providedfor in this section may not be waived as to the debtor's interest in household
furnishings, goods, and appliances, wearing apparel of the debtor and his dependenIs tools of
trade,farm implements, or professional libraries;'professionaly prescribed health aids necessay to
the health or ability to work of the debtor or his dependents; orfamiy religious volumes, portraits,
books, and heirlooms of substantial personal, sentimental or historical value, by creation of non-
possessog, nonpurchase-money security interest therein. Provided, however, if the debtor owns
property in the aforesaid categories of a value in excess of one thousand dollars, or in working
toos ofhis trade or occupation in excess of fiy dollars, an itemized list of such property, together
with a designation of the value of each item thereof, shall be attached to the security agreement at
the time the security interest is taken, and a creditor may take a security interest in the excess over
one thousand dollars, or in the case of working tools of the debtor's trade or occupation in excess of
flfiy dollars, by requiring the debtor to select his exemption h7 writing at the time credit is
extended.
Use of the value limitations in the West Virginia statute set forth above should not be
construed as the author's endorsement of their propriety. See notes 205-207 supra.
218 Enactment of such a statute would present difficult problems in drafting a provision
harmonious with existing law. Under article 9 of the U.C.C. a valid security agreement must
include a description of the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-203. As a general rule, a detailed descrip-
tion of collateral is not required on an item by item basis. In re Amex-Protein Dev. Corp.,
504 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 470 F.2d 944 (8th Cir. 1973).
219 A suggested form of enactment is:
Any instrument which creates a consensual lien, security interest or chattel
mortgage in favor of a creditor in all personal property owned or possessed by a
debtor will not operate to create such an interest in any of the debtor's personal
property which is, or may be claimed as, exempt under the laws of this state. Ex-
emption rights in personal property may be waived by execution of such an instru-
ment only in cases where the specific item of exempt property made subject to the
creditor's interest is individually identified and creation of such an interest is not
otherwise proscribed by law [referring to provisions creating and defining basic ex-
empt necessities].
220 As discussed earlier, many jurisdictions have enacted statutes making security interests
in exempt chattels enforceable. See note 36 supra. Wholesale change in such states must nec-
essarily await legislative action.
221 But see Beneficial Consumer Discount Co. v. Hamlin, 263 Pa. Super. Ct. 393, 398 A.2d
193 (1979).
222 See note 39 supra.
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curtailed by judicial action. Dragnet collateral clauses, generally
found in boilerplate consumer loan agreements, 2 23 are both uncon-
scionable and contrary to the policy behind state exemption statutes.
a. Public Polio,
Early decisions found prospective exemption waivers to be in-
consistent with public policy because they permitted debtors to for-
feit the right to retain exempt chattels against creditors' claims. 2 24
The courts felt the debtor was unlikely to appreciate the significance
of the waiver or to understand its consequences upon default. In
contrast, the chattel mortgage was viewed as a present, implied
waiver 225 of exemption rights and a transfer of interest in specific
items of property.2 26 The chattel mortgage was less threatening to
the debtor because its consequences were more easily appreciated at
the time of its execution. 227
The dragnet collateral clause more closely resembles the pro-
spective waiver than the grant of a security interest in a specific item
of personal property. The debtor relinquishes his exemption rights
by signing a document containing a vague clause purporting to cre-
ate a security interest in all the debtor's personalty. Although in
form a present release and transfer of rights has been affected, the
substance of the transaction is identical to a prospective exemption
waiver. The same rationale that prompted courts to refuse to enforce
prospective waivers logically requires that dragnet collateral clauses
not be enforced 228 in derogation of debtors' exemption rights.2 29 The
223 See, e.g., Hernandez v. S.I.C. Fin. Co., 79 N.M. 673, 448 P.2d 474 (1968); State v.
AVCO Fin. Serv., 50 N.Y.2d 383, 406 N.E.2d 1075, 429 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1980); Montford v.
Grohman, 36 N.C. App. 733, 245 S.E.2d 219 (1978).
224 See Section III supra.
225 E.g., City Loan & Say. Co. v. Keenan, 136 Ohio St. 125, 24 N.E.2d 452 (1939); Mor-
gan Plan Co. v. Ates, 8 La. App. 806 (1928).
226 The early decisions considered chattel mortgages covering interests in specific assets, as
opposed to across-the board grants of security interests in all of the debtors' property. See, e.g.,
Ohio Loan Co. v. Kletecka, 47 Ohio App. 514, 192 N.E. 182 (1934) (specifically listed articles
subject to chattel mortgage).
227 See Carter's Adm'rs v. Carter, 20 Fla. 558, 570 (1881).
228 Such arguments have been rejected in several recent decisions. See Hemandez v.
S.I.C. Fin. Co., 79 N.M. 673, 448 P.2d 474 (1968); State v. AVCO Fin. Servs., 50 N.Y.2d 383,
406 N.E.2d 1075, 429 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1980); Montford v. Grohman, 36 N.C. App. 733, 735,
245 S.E.2d 219, 222 (1978). The Heandez, AVCO, and Monford courts emphasized the debt-
ors' ight to sell or otherwise dispose of their property and freedom of contract principles.
These courts also relied on earlier decisions permitting foreclosure of mortgages on specific
exempt chattels. As discussed above, such reasoning is simply unsound when reconciling pub-
lic policy with other legal principles.
229 Provided the dragnet clause is a mutually agreed upon contract term, the courts
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result will not be to nullify the clause in loto, but merely to deny
enforcement as to security interests in exempt chattels.
b. Unconscionability
Dragnet collateral clauses are vulnerable to charges of uncon-
scionability. A contract or clause may be unconscionable 230 either if
the bargain was reached in the absence of meaningful free assent 231
or if the substantive terms are so heavily one-sided as to make its
enforcement manifestly unfair.2 32
Under section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code, uncon-
scionability is expressly applied to the law of sales. 233 The concept,
however, is not limited to "transactions in goods.1234 Its common
law roots are evident in several pre-U.C.C. decisions. 235 Specific stat-
should deny enforcement of the security agreement on public policy grounds only to the
extent necessary to protect exemption rights.
230 See Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionabliy, 78 YALE LJ. 757 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as Ellinghaus]. Professor Ellinghaus characterized unconscionability as a legal "standard"
under the definition formulated in Pound, The Theory ofJudicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REv.
641, 645-46 (1923). The unconscionability standard functions in a manner akin to other
"residual categories" in law, such as "good faith," "reasonableness," and "due care," as a
principled, if ephemeral, guide to decisionmaking in the development of the common law.
Ellinghaus, supra note 230, at 759-60. Cf. Leff, Unconscionabilit and the Code, 115 U. PA. L.
REV. 485 (1967) (criticizing the ill defined, vague nature of unconscionability).
231 This type of unconscionability has been termed "procedural unconscionability." It
can include deceptive bargaining conduct, use of adhesion contracts, taking advantage of
unequal bargaining power, and exploitation of the underprivileged. Ellinghaus, supra note
230, at 762-73.
232 Unconscionability can also be substantive. Substantive unconscionability requires
nonenforcement of one-sided contract terms in some cases notwithstanding equality of bar-
gaining position and the presence of meaningful free assent. Ellinghaus, supra note 230, at
773-808.
233 Article 2 of the U.C.C. governs the law of sales, which it defines in the following terms:
Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article applies to transactions in
goods; it does not apply to any transaction which although in the form of an uncon-
ditional contract to sell or present sale is intended to operate only as a security
transaction nor does this Article impair or repeal any statute regulating sales to
consumers, farmers or other specified classes of buyers.
U.C.C. § 2-102. U.C.C. § 2-302 provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse
to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportu-
nity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the
court in making the determination.
234 Such is the limited scope of Article Two of the Code. U.C.C. § 2-102.
235 See, e.g., authorities cited in Official Comment to U.C.C. § 2-302. See Ellinghaus, supra
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utory treatment of unconscionability in the U.C.C. Article on sales
should not limit its application in other contexts, including secured
transactions. 236 Several states have recognized that unconscionabil-
ity is an appropriate standard in consumer credit transactions. A
number of statutes have been enacted permitting courts to refuse to
enforce credit terms found to be unconscionable.2 37
In several cases, debtors have challenged as unconscionable se-
curity interests in exempt property created by dragnet collateral pro-
visions. In Hemandez v. SIC Finance Co. ,238 the New Mexico
Supreme Court upheld the enforcement of a clause subjecting all of
the plaintiff's personalty, including otherwise exempt household fur-
nishings, to a creditor's security interest.239 The debtors were immi-
grants of Hispanic descent, without formal education. Although the
creditor had not explained the terms of the agreement to the debtors,
the court refused to employ unconscionability standards in its analy-
sis of the contract.24° In contrast, the Court of Appeals of New York
recently 24' recognized the propriety of applying unconscionability
standards to dragnet collateral provisions but refused to enjoin their
use on grounds of unconscionability. 242 The New York court noted
that the doctrine of unconscionability was not aimed at "disturbance
of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power, but in-
stead at 'the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise'. 2 43 The
note 230, at 808-12. Unconscionability is a "flexible doctrine with roots in equity." State v.
AVCO Fin. Servs., 50 N.Y.2d 383, 389, 406 N.E.2d 1075, 1078, 429 N.Y.S.2d 181, 185 (1980)
(citing cases).
236 The application of unconscionability to security interests created by dragnet collateral
clauses is, in one sense, divorced from the central theme of this paper-the interplay between
state exemption policy and the rights of secured creditors. The use of dragnet collateral
clauses, however, relates to the concept of procedural unconscionability. The thoroughly one-
sided nature of such contract provisions is a matter of substantive unconscionability.
237 ALA. CODE § 5-19-16 (1975); D.C. CODE § 28-3812 (1971); IDAHO CODE § 28-35-108
(1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-5-108 (Burns 1974); IOWA CODE ANN. § 537.5-108 (West
Supp. 1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-5-108 (1974); LA. Civ. CODE § 9:3516(29) (West Supp.
1980); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 5-108 (West 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-43 (Cum.
Supp. 1979); OHio REv. CODE § 1345.03 (Page 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A § 5-108
(West 1972); S.C. CODE § 37-5-108 (Cum. Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70B-5-108
(1953); W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-121 (1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 425.107 (West 1974 & Supp.
1980).
238 79 N.M. 673, 448 P.2d 474 (1968).
239 Id. at 675, 448 P.2d at 476.
240 Id.
241 State v. AVCO Fin. Servs., 50 N.Y.2d 383, 406 N.E.2d 1075, 429 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1980).
242 Id. at 386, 406 N.E.2d at 1076, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 183. AVCO was a case brought by the
New York Attorney General on a consumer complaint. The state sought an order enjoining
AVCO's use of a dragnet collateral clause. See note 44 sup ra.
243 50 N.Y.2d at 389, 406 N.E.2d at 1076, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 185 (citations omitted).
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court appeared to consider unconscionability an inappropriate stan-
dard by which to invalidate dragnet collateral provisions, but its
holding is more readily explained by the lack of an adequate record
upon which to consider the unconscionability issue. 2 "
Dragnet collateral provisions should be subject to judicial invali-
dation on grounds of unconscionability. These clauses give creditors
the power to compel payment or refinancing 245 by defaulting debtors
without clear identification of the specific items of personalty that
will be subject to seizure and sale. The fundamental unfairness of
dragnet collateral clauses is evident when one considers that they op-
erate, sub silentio, to abrogate debtors' exemption rights.
In light of decisions invalidating prospective exemption waiv-
ers,246 creditors turned to dragnet collateral clauses to accomplish im-
pliedly what the prospective waiver could no longer do expressly. As
the product of this effort, the dragnet collateral clause is substan-
tively unconscionable. Moreover, the indicia of procedural uncon-
scionability are likely to be present when dragnet collateral
provisions are included in security agreements.2 47
IV. Conclusion
Exemption statutes are intended to insulate debtors and their
families from destitution. In most jurisdictions the protection af-
forded by exemption statutes is seriously impaired by the ability of
creditors to enforce security interests in exempt property.
State legislatures should identify basic necessities that should be
protected from the reach of creditors and enact legislation prohibit-
244 Id. at 389, 406 N.E.2d at 1076, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 185. Unconscionability was not ar-
gued by the plaintiff at the trial court level. The trial court enjoined use of the clause on
public policy grounds. Unconscionability was raised for the first time on appeal. The Appel-
late Division adopted it as the grounds for its order enjoining use of the clause.
245 Such clauses provide creditors with a weapon that is powerful to the point of unfair-
ness. One can appreciate the in !errorem effect of a creditor's threat to seize any or all of a
debtor's personal property and-to sell it to satisfy the debt. Many of the items of utmost
importance to the security and comfort of the debtor and his family, such as household fur-
nishings and bedding, the loss of which would subject them to substantial hardship, are of
little economic value to the creditor. How much could a creditor expect to realize from the
forced sale of a used mattress or used clothing?
Congress, in enacting debtors' bankruptcy lien avoidance powers, 11 U.S.C. § 522()
(Supp. 1978), concluded that nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interests in exempt
chattels are instruments of "creditor abuse" rather than "legitimate credit-facilitating de-
vices." See Note, Constitutionality of Retroactive Lien Avoidance under Bankrptcy Code Section 52269,
94 HARv. L. REv. 1616, 1618-19 (1981).
246 See Section III supra.
247 See note 231 supra.
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ing security interests in such property. Further, the courts should
invalidate as unconscionable security interests in exempt property
created by dragnet collateral clauses. Admittedly, these remedial
measures will restrict creditors' and debtors' rights. If the goals of
exemption policy are to be achieved, however, strict adherence to
traditional notions of freedom of contract and property rights must
be abandoned.
